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ABSTRACT 
ARRESTING BEAUTY, FRAMING EVIDENCE: 
AN INQUIRY INTO PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE TEACHING OF WRITING 
by 
Kuhio Walters 
University of New Hampshire, May, 2009 
This dissertation examines the uses and conceptualizations of photography in 
college Composition. Composition has long been conflicted over the relation between 
form and content—and since the 1970s, between aesthetics and politics. Today, this 
disciplinary tension manifests in how the visual is brought into pedagogy: either it is 
approached aesthetically, as something to beautify a text, or politically, as a source of 
cultural critique. The field's uses of photography have been positioned within this 
aesthetics/politics binary, but to understand the medium as only one or the other is to 
miss its full practical and theoretical potential. 
Theoretically, photography is powerful and poignant because it is both a product 
of society and a work of art; both ideological artifact and piece of the natural world; both 
beautiful and deceptive. As an utterly ambiguous object of questionable knowledge, the 
photograph is an ideal tool for introducing students to the genuine challenges of 
interpretation. Practically, photographs are easily examined by groups of students, are 
convenient points of reflection for class discussion, and are pleasing to work into one's 
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written text. This pleasure is key: it makes the act of composing an affective, critical, 
artistic, and thoroughly rhetorical process. 
Each chapter ties these practical and theoretical qualities of the photograph into 
different areas of concern to writing teachers. Chapter I looks at the ways photography is 
usually situated by social pedagogies, arguing that personal and aesthetic uses of 
photography also help students develop critical thinking skills. Chapter II considers the 
poststructural critique of a "stable self in autobiography, arguing the photo-essay can 
help students maintain a strong narrative voice in spite of this de-stabilizing of self. 
Chapter III considers how photography helps students meld affective and intellectual 
aspects of subjective experience into research writing. Chapter IV considers the moral 
challenges posed by looking at disturbing photographs, arguing that asking students to 
work on such images aesthetically helps them confront the horrific events depicted, but in 
a way that is survivable. The chapters build in ethical complexity, but aesthetics and 




Though this dissertation focuses on photography and its unsettled relation to 
composition, my thinking throughout is firmly rooted in arguments that are familiar to the 
teaching of writing. Photography is the main theoretical vehicle in each chapter, in other 
words, but the larger argument is this: when it comes to educating First Year college 
writers, personal pleasure is fundamental to the development of critical thinking. I extend 
this by claiming, further, that even political thinking demands a kind of aesthetic 
engagement. Another way to say this is that one's attention to form and style cannot be 
fully sifted out of one's views on a political problem, even if that problem demands 
immediate ethical action. This isn't to disregard the need for ethical action in society, but 
only to point out that political thought is never free of aesthetic considerations (especially 
visual pleasure). Each chapter extends this claim into various areas of concern for 
compositionists. In this sense, photography serves as a theoretical metaphor, allowing me 
to take a new look at old topics. 
Indeed, photography can powerfully demonstrate the relation between aesthetics 
and politics, for reasons this dissertation will explore at length. But it must be emphasized 
again that the aesthetics/politics relationship has always concerned teachers of college 
writing, with or without photography. Even if they do not bring visual materials into their 
classrooms, writing teachers have long confronted the slippery relation between form and 
content—or, since the 1970s, between a writer's personal style, and her consciousness of 
social history and politics. For this reason, I begin this dissertation by situating 
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photography squarely within the history of American writing instruction, briefly 
sketching how it relates to the three most commonly acknowledged writing pedagogies: 
current-traditional or positivist, process-oriented or expressive, and the social or social 
constructivist approach. I do not have the space here to provide a nuanced description of 
composition's rich history. I am silent on the cognitive approach, for example, as well as 
various versions of social pedagogy that Lester Faigley discusses in his historical essay, 
"Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and a Proposal" (1986). At the very least, 
however, we will get a sense of how style and political awareness have been held in 
tension in writing pedagogy, especially over the last few decades. Photography needs to 
be situated in relation to and within this tense dynamic, if we are to understand the 
medium's full potential as a feature of composition. 
Positivist rhetoric, the original model for mass writing instruction in the U.S. 
(against which expressivism and social constructivism took shape as forms of political 
and pedagogical protest), dominated the field through the nineteenth-century and well 
into the twentieth, and can probably still be found in many composition programs. It 
emphasizes mechanical correctness and relies on stylistic abstractions to explain good 
writing—such as the famous triad of style, "Unity, Coherence, Emphasis." (Bob Connors 
in Composition-Rhetoric called these "the master static abstractions," "the doughty 
trinity" that were used to generally define good writing for over a century (294).) The 
positivist classroom is also product-centered. In Academic Discourse and Critical 
Consciousness, Patricia Bizzell calls it the "black box" approach, in which a writing 
assignment is inserted at one end, the finished product comes out the other, and the 
teacher has no sense of the process that occurs in between (176). In "How the Writing 
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Process was Born—and Other Conversion Narratives," Lad Tobin sums up the approach 
as "traditional, product-driven, rules-based, correctness-obsessed," with the only 
"process" being when the student must "write, proofread, hand in, and then move on to 
next week's assignment" (5). 
In this model, good writing cannot be taught, but students can be drilled in the 
rules that seem to empirically govern great literature. Therefore, its main theoretical 
object is "style," by which it tends to mean, as Bob Connors writes, "grammatical purity 
and propriety" (Composition-Rhetoric 126). This reductive sense of style is traceable to 
the 19th-century originators of composition curricula, such as A.S. Hill, John Genung, and 
Barrett Wendell, and even further back to Hugh Blair, George Campbell, and Richard 
Whately, philosophical proponents of Scottish Common Sense Realism. By the time 
classical rhetoric had sifted through the medieval epoch and been processed by Blair, it 
had become little more than an emphasis on grammar-as-style, stripped of any connection 
to invention—never mind ethos, pathos, or logos. In addition, Blair believed the most 
admirable goal for young writers was to aspire toward the style of canonical literature. 
(Albert Kitzhaber notes, in his Rhetoric in American Colleges, that Blair's Lectures on 
Rhetoric and Belles Lettres were extremely influential: it was published in 1783 and was 
by far the most widely circulated rhetoric text in Britain and the U.S. for over sixty years, 
influencing rhetoric texts long after it had been taken out of print (50).) 
Combine this tendency toward belletrism, the emphasis on style as adherence to 
the "rules," and the 19th-century American university's growing fascination with rigorous 
German empiricism (essentially scientific positivism applied to the natural and human 
sciences), and you have a new, uniquely American kind of pedagogy. On the one hand it 
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is a dream of pure rationality, "concerned solely with the communication of truth that is 
certain and empirically verifiable," James Berlin wrote ("Contemporary Composition: 
The Major Pedagogical Theories" 770). On the other, it is the pedagogical equivalent of 
the New Criticism, using close reading to empirically valorize canonical texts. A student 
with an unconventional composing process doesn't stand a chance in such an approach; 
he is subjected to grammar drills, sentence-combining, and abstract notions of good 
writing, all intended to help him approach the vaulted style of great works of literature. 
This was the stark pedagogical scene that gave rise to and stoked the political fires of 
expressivism. 
The first, revolutionary act of process rhetoric was, simply enough, to conduct 
research into the writing process. James Marshall sees 1963's Research in Written 
Composition by Dick Braddock, Richard Lloyd-Jones, and Lowell Schoer's as "one of 
the anchoring documents of our professional interest" in process pedagogy ("Of What 
Does Skill in Writing Consist?" 45). Lester Faigley also sees it as a "convenient 
landmark" for marking our disciplinary origins, because of its focus on process 
("Competing Theories of Process: A Critique and Proposal" 527). In "Pre-Writing: the 
Stage of Discovery in the Writing Process," D. Gordon Rohman claimed, as his title 
suggests, that writing consists of distinct stages, one of which was thinking before 
writing. "Good thinking can produce good writing; and, conversely, without good 
thinking, good writing is impossible" (106). In The Composing Processes of Twelfth 
Graders, Janet Emig supported this idea of an internal process that precedes the 
production of a finished text: writing "does not occur as a left-to-right, solid, 
uninterrupted activity with an even pace" (84). The processes were variously explained— 
e.g., Rohman saw it as linear and progressive; Emig, as overlapping and recursive—but 
for the first time, teachers were behaving as if, in James Britton's words, "knowledge is a 
process of knowing rather than a storehouse of the known" ("Language and Learning 
Across the Curriculum" 221). (Expressivism, for example, shifted grading practice "from 
summative to formative evaluation," Lester Faigley writes ("Judging Writing, Judging 
Selves" 395).) 
Here, the concept of style is again a central aspect of pedagogy, but it varies 
greatly from the positivist model. Whereas a positivist pedagogy hollows rhetoric out to 
be little more than style as rule-following, in the service of the Great Books, the rhetoric 
of expressivism packs into style a whole network of aesthetic, political, and rhetorical 
meanings and purposes. To take a prime example, in Writing Without Teachers (his first 
book on composition and a clarion call for process pedagogy), Peter Elbow shows us that 
writing pedagogy must now search for style in a much wider range of spaces, notably, 
"inside the author's head or...inside the heads of readers" (158), as well as within 
"maverick readings and naive readings of strong simple feelings" (159). Style no longer 
resides solely outside the student writer, in culturally sanctioned literary texts, but can 
also be found within the creative imaginations of each literate person. 
For the first time, the subjective experiences of students were seen as both 
pedagogically and politically useful. Typically student-centered, the expressivistic 
classroom militates against the positivistic view of students as empty vessels, teachers as 
fountains with true knowledge, and the act of writing as a mechanistic way to test the 
successful transfer of this knowledge. Student knowledge, in fact, dialogically shapes the 
classroom experience, and the expressivistic teacher is more a facilitator of conversations 
than a rule-enforcer (of grammar, spelling, syntax rules, etc). 
However, the most politically charged claim of expressivism, it seems, is that a 
strong sense of style in writing can reveal the unique identity, persona, or voice of the 
writer. About a process-oriented course they designed at the University of New 
Hampshire, Don Murray and Les Fisher write, "our students began to discover they had 
something to say, [and] they began to hear a distinctive voice, their own, saying it" 
("Perhaps the Professor Should Cut Class" 170). Here, a writer's style can communicate 
a strong, identifiable subjectivity, or unique voice. In the positivist classroom, this voice 
is marginalized, penalized, disciplined, silenced for the sake of the Ideal Voice of 
culture—that is, the voice of a stable, unchanging cultural style that supposedly 
transcends history and individual differences. In the expressivist classroom, the student's 
authentic voice—commonly found in the personal essay, for which the student has 
chosen the topic—is both a structuring principle and a form of resistance to the alienating 
environment of the corporatized university system. 
The social approach to pedagogy also attacks positivist rhetoric at its roots, but 
from a different angle: there is no "stable, unchanging cultural style" because all style is 
constructed discursively, historically, socially. However, this critique of style as a social 
construction also becomes a critique of expressivism, since, as Lester Faigley writes in 
"Judging Writing, Judging Selves," the "unified, individual consciousness coterminous 
with the physical body turns out not to be the 'natural' self but a Western version with 
specific historical and economic origins" (396). That is, if style derives from the writer's 
unique identity, as expressive scholars suggest, than "unique identity" also becomes a 
problematic concept. Furthermore, since expressivism tends to value personal (especially 
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autobiographical and narrative) over academic (especially expository and critical) kinds 
of writing, the social approach generally sees expressivism as being too self-absorbed, 
even solipsistic, and naive about the role of history in shaping the writing act. Alan 
France goes so far as to argue that personal writing "reinforces students' social alienation 
and insularity by encouraging them to identify good writing with the ideal of the 
autonomous self, the 'authentic voice,' ignoring the cultural and historical determinants 
of individual identity" ("Assigning Places" 600). 
So, while the expressive and social approaches agree that positivism is bad, they 
agree on little else. They especially disagree on whether or not style is a relevant matter 
of concern in a First Year writing course. The answer to this question has consequences 
for classroom practice: if the goal of First Year writing is to help students take some 
pleasure in the writing act so that they are more likely to enjoy composing, and therefore 
more likely to use writing as a way to learn later in their lives, then expressivism's 
fondness for personal writing and its emphasis on a strong prose style is preferable; 
however, if the goal is to produce ethical thinkers who can use writing to engage the 
important political issues in society, then social constructivism's fondness for expository 
analysis and ideological critique is preferable. 
Of course, we are doing a disservice to our students and ourselves if we allow the 
line between the personal and the political, and the aesthetical and ethical, to be so 
absolute. My own bias is toward personal narratives and a close attention to (verbal and 
visual) aesthetics—a personal preference this dissertation doesn't hide—but for me, this 
doesn't mean politics and aesthetics are mutually exclusive. In fact, I follow many 
compositionists in searching for a middle path between these categories. For example, in 
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Romancing Rhetorics, Sherry Gradin, an expressivist with clear attachments to personal 
narrative writing, writes that "we must examine the cultural T we privilege .. . 
rigorously" (106). And in "Competing Theories of Process," Lester Faigley, clearly a 
social constructivist with attachments to poststructural theory, writes that the process 
movement has "given student writing a value and authority absent in current-traditional 
approaches," no small thing in an educational system that so often devalues the subjective 
experiences of students (537). Attempts at hybridity between expressive and social 
concerns, of which this dissertation is one, are more the norm than the exception in 
Composition scholarship today. 
I take this to be a good thing, and further that any absolute distinction between 
aesthetics and politics is unrealistic, a belief that is obviously not restricted to 
Composition. In the introduction to Between Ethics and Aesthetics, an interdisciplinary 
essay collection that deals with this same issue, Dorota Glowacka and Stephen Boos 
observe that at many points during the history of philosophy, the aesthetical and the 
ethical have been viewed as intimately connected. The authors observe that Kant 
powerfully articulated the "problematic nature of the relationship between beauty 
and...moral goodness" (1); Friedrich Schiller contended "that aesthetic education alone 
enables humanity to make the transition from nature to moral and political freedom" (2); 
Nietzsche posited "that the existence of the world can be legitimated only on aesthetic 
grounds" (2); and numerous poststructural thinkers, following Emmanuel Levinas' 
theories of alterity, "have searched for [ethical] ways to [aesthetically] articulate the 
exteriority that transcends thought itself and therefore remains nonrepresentable" (3). In 
the same book, artist and critic Alex Colville makes the historical observation that the 
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highest visual arts of any age have always revealed that age's "political aspirations" 
("Beauty and the Beast" 253), and Elizabeth Edwards suggests that the most important 
function of art is to resist and subvert "the malevolent gaze of a totalizing ethics" ("The 
Banal Profound and the Profoundly Banal" 271). 
The essays in Between Ethics and Aesthetics show us that a theory of 
Composition based either totally on a desire for ethics, or totally on a search for the 
beautiful, fails to account for the historical and philosophical intersections between the 
two categories. The photographic pedagogy described in this dissertation suggests a way 
to combine them without privileging one over the other. Hybrid expressive/social 
pedagogies are becoming more common, as I noted above, but when it comes to 
photography, the social view seems to have dominated the field. The social approach 
tends to ignore the photograph's epistemological idiosyncrasies (i.e., the photograph is a 
representation that is also a slice of the real—more on this in Chapter I). The traditional 
concerns of an expressive pedagogy—writing is a pleasurable act; students' personal 
experiences are valuable sources of academic meaning; an attention to style and 
aesthetics is an important part of developing critical thinking skills—help us balance out 
this lopsided discourse on the photographic image. 
To restate the core argument of this dissertation, an attention to aesthetics 
strengthens, rather than weakens, political thinking. Social constructivism has tended to 
argue the opposite position, that aesthetic concerns are superfluous to thinking about 
political issues. I don't think such an argument is necessary. In fact, perhaps we can ask 
whether young writers should be required to be ethical in the classroom—we can doubt 
that the teacher's political sensibilities can (or should) be imposed onto the student. There 
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is no reason to expect a student (or teacher) to authentically engage an ethical dilemma if 
this dilemma is disconnected from his notion of what is beautiful, disgusting, tragic, 
melancholy, etc. A teacher can ask a student to think critically about a topic, but if we 
expect anything more than lip service paid to a shallow political correctness, we will also 
have to engage him emotionally, affectively. Affect is difficult to weave into pedagogy, 
since it is comprised of subtle, fleeting qualities of experience that are difficult to analyze 
and evaluate. But by bringing enjoyable aesthetic practices into the classroom, we can 
bring affect and critical analysis together to form an authentic response to real world 
problems. Working on photographs—taking pictures, cropping and framing them, pasting 
them into an essay, describing them with the right words—helps writers think closely 
about the aesthetic conditions that accompany political thought. 
I believe, in other words, that students can be helped toward the pleasures of 
scholarly critique and, perhaps, political agency, but first they need an opportunity to take 
pleasure in the art of composing. (I suspect there is a pleasure in even the most disturbing 
scholarly work, but its serious nature generally keeps us from acknowledging the ways 
that it satisfies aesthetic, as well as ethical, sensibilities—a claim I develop further in 
Chapter IV). Each chapter of this dissertation offers photographic practices that connect 
this kind of pleasure with particular writing assignments. Moreover, the assignments in 
each chapter build toward increasingly complex ethical and aesthetic issues, requiring 
writers to gradually become more nuanced in their creative and rhetorical practices. 
Chapter I, "Composed and Framed: Photography within and Beyond Visual 
Studies," makes two key points. First, it aims to demonstrate that the unique properties of 
the photograph have been obscured by "social semiotics," a method of visual analysis 
11 
that tends to diminish the role of emotion in the creation of cultural meaning. The critical 
social bias of social semiotics reflects a broader anxiety in our field concerning the role 
of affect, aesthetics, and subjective experience in photography. It seems as if the camera 
(so closely linked to popular aesthetics and personal experience) can only support a 
socially progressive pedagogy if we restrain its capacity for visual pleasure. However, 
this chapter argues that Roland Barthes' conception of photography—which sees affect 
and aesthetics as central to the political life of the medium—can actually sensitize us to 
history and urgent social issues, because it calls viewers and writers into an uncommon 
space of reflection, where the private and the public intersect. Second, this chapter offers 
activities with photography that allow students to link their writing act with the aesthetic 
pleasures of visual design. 
Chapter II, '"Visible Things' and Beyond: Photography, Voice, and the Personal 
Narrative," argues that photography can help the personal essay account for the 
poststructural critique of voice, while also giving students multiple ways to perform some 
of the complex subject positions valued by poststructuralism. The debate over what 
defines good writing has a long history, one whose axis has often been the conflict 
between the "personal" and the "academic." This chapter challenges this distinction, 
looking at the idea of a writer's personal "voice" and style as a complex performance of 
subjectivity that meshes well with photography. In this sense, Chapter II endorses the 
poststructural concept of the de-centered, unsettled Subject. Along with personal writing, 
photography reveals the troubled nature of representation and subjectivity. However, the 
assignments I describe at the end of this chapter also allow for a range of performances of 
12 
subjectivity that make the combination of "life writing" and "light writing" a potent form 
of cultural engagement. 
Chapter III, "The Art of Seeking: Photography and the Research Essay," contends 
that research writing benefits from the use of photographs, but not only as a source of 
completely objective data; photography can also reveal the ambiguity that is inherent to 
any fact-based inquiry into human culture. Photography, with its natural affinity to 
Surrealism, reveals the research process as an art that composes and frames, but never 
completely erases, the mysteries of everyday life. This may seem an odd claim, since 
research assignments have traditionally been geared toward logic, linearity, and 
coherence, and surrealism seems to contradict these terms. However, I follow Rosalind 
Krauss in positioning photography as one of the building blocks of the surrealist 
aesthetic, agreeing with her that "in cutting into the body of the world, stopping it, 
framing it, spacing it, photography reveals that world as written" (40). Photography 
cracks open the visual world to reveal patterns of meaning that are otherwise invisible. 
Seeking, in this context, is a matter of learning more about the world, but also a process 
of "unlearning," as Bruce Ballenger calls it (The Curious Researcher 4). That is, skillful 
research includes re-envisioning experience—looking around with "a wild eye," as the 
surrealists used to say. Research writing may not have a reputation for this kind of 
charisma, but the camera contributes to its creative possibilities, helping students gather 
visual data that can launch inquiry and thicken written narrative. 
The fourth and final chapter, "Disturbing Pleasure: Photography and the 
Im/possible Ethics of Catastrophe," considers the role of photography in commemorating 
catastrophic events and atrocities. Disturbing photographs, monuments to the worst 
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moments in human history, seem ever capable of turning viewers into voyeurs. Viewers 
of such images need to be ethical witnesses to the horrific events, critics of the 
photograph say, not pleasure seekers. However, rather than simply not looking at such 
images, or looking at them only with pious moral regard, this chapter contends that 
voyeurism precedes every act of witnessing. That is, an inexplicable visual pleasure, 
perhaps registered as a piquant curiosity or an inability to look away, is the root of 
critical, ethical vision. This chapter looks for the genius of photography in the 
governmental and journalistic uses of catastrophe images, and will generate such 
questions as: Do disturbing images impact the everyday goals of teaching, reading, and 
writing? How might our society be damaged not only by war but also by photographs of 
war, long after the physical conflict has ended? Given the technological and aesthetic 
affordances and restrictions of camera technology, is it possible to develop a set of photo 
practices that acknowledges and respects the suffering of others? How can photography 
or writing engage history ethically, when history is so painful and photography so 
saturated with pleasure? This chapter concludes, also, by offering photographic practices 
I have used successfully in my own teaching. 
Overall, this dissertation proposes a First Year writing curriculum that uses 
photography and writing to lead students into increasingly more complex considerations 
of the relation between aesthetics and ethics. This folds neatly into the history of 
composition, which has long wrestled with form versus content, personal versus political, 
artful versus ethical. The goal, ultimatel , is twofold: to create a teaching practice that 
will allow students to make more sense of the visual and verbal worlds they inhabit, and 
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to help them find pleasure—aesthetic, ethical, personal, communal—that will lead them 
back to the acts of writing, looking closely, and thinking critically and creatively. 
15 
CHAPTER I 
COMPOSED AND FRAMED: PHOTOGRAPHY WITHIN AND BEYOND VISUAL 
STUDIES 
I wanted to learn at all costs what Photography was 'in itself, by what 
essential feature it was to be distinguished from the community of images. 
Such a desire really meant that beyond the evidence provided by technology 
and usage, and despite its tremendous contemporary expansion, I wasn't sure 
that Photography existed, that it had a 'genius' of its own. 
—Barthes, Camera Lucida (3) 
What is the "genius" of photography, to borrow Barthes' term? How can it be 
distinguished from the other visual media—cinema, painting, sculpture, and theater, for 
example—that saturate and give shape to the visible world? This question defies its 
commonsense answer. The medium is generically defined by its specific technology, the 
camera, and by its product, the still image. But such a definition offers very little, if the 
goal is to understand photography culturally and semiotically. It leaves unexamined the 
immense role photography plays in global culture, for example, or how deeply the 
photograph has become enmeshed with the act of remembering, on both public and 
personal levels. Such a definition fails come to grips with the complex role of 
photography in shaping either culture or individual subjects. How, then, to draw out 
photography from the community of images, and how to find the significance of its 
genius for the teaching of writing? 
This chapter attempts to answer these questions from two directions. First, it 
confirms a primary claim of much contemporary Visual Studies, namely, that the visual 
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needs to be a more prominent and integral aspect of Composition. Second, it 
distinguishes the photograph from the broader realm of "the Visual," as "Visual Studies" 
usually constructs this concept. 
This argument is difficult to make because it relies on the rhetorical work Visual 
Studies has accomplished, such as analyzing the relation of the visual to literacy and 
clearing a space for visual work in the writing classroom, but at the same time maintains 
that Visual Studies has not gone far enough in thinking about photography. I use Roland 
Barthes' notion of the "punctum" to problematize the common practice of lumping 
photography into the same category as all other visual modes of representation. In 
summary, this chapter, by calling attention to the photograph as a unique visual object, 
also points out the following irony: the currently dominant means of talking about 
visuality in Composition reduces the ways we can theorize the photograph. 
An understanding of Barthes' work is central to this chapter, but before looking 
closely at his conception of the photograph, I will review a few key texts in Composition 
that deal with photography. Though I look at various approaches to visual culture, the 
work of the New London Group is prominent here. This group of scholars has done much 
to theorize the relation of the visual to literacy, but I will focus on the scholarship of two 
of its more prominent members—Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen—to consider the 
limitations of Visual Studies as it is usually practiced. When Barthes' work is finally 
addressed directly—in the subsection below titled The Photograph Returns—it should 
be clear that the systematic rigor of contemporary Visual Studies, especially in the form 
known as "social semiotics," while pioneering a new vision of writing instruction, has not 
sufficiently explained the significance of photography's relation to affect. 
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The First Revolution: Pleasure and the Photographic Image 
Though book-length inquiries that merged photographic images and primary 
education existed as early as the 1940s (see Williams' Learning with Pictures), Hart Day 
Leavitt and David Sohn's Stop, Look, and Write! was, as far as I know, the first entirely 
photograph-based Composition textbook aimed at secondary- and college-level writing 
classes. The book's format consists of thematic chapters with thematically related 
photographs—for example, shots of people in deep concentration, humorous photos, 
abstract shapes, images of animals—followed by brief writing prompts that ask students 
to reflect on the images (for instance, "For each picture, list three details that show the 
[subject's] concentration," 1). Their goal is to offer "a way of seeing which will spread 
through an individual's entire life, from thinking to writing, to personal relationships, to 
studying, to emotional reactions, and to inspiration" (Stop, Look, and Write! 222). 
Three principles underscore Leavitt and Sohn's pedagogy. First, they are 
explicitly reverential toward the "the great photographer," as evidenced in their prefatory 
remarks: 
Here is a unique new method of learning to write that is as revolutionary as it 
is simple. Based on the principle that all effective writing depends primarily 
on accurate, insightful observation, it teaches the student how to see life with 
the perceptive eye of the great photographer. Then, the student learns how to 
express himself and what he has observed in an entirely fresh and original 
way. (Stop, Look, and Write! inside back cover) 
With a stock of expressly artistic images from the likes of Robert Capa, Edward Steichen, 
Henri Cartier-Bresson, and other "prizewinners," the text asserts that the vision 
represented by these structurally beautiful photographs is vision at its best. There is 
pleasure to be derived from this kind of looking, and if students learn to see their 
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experience as it is portrayed in such photos, they will have a heightened grasp of reality 
that will be conveyed through their writing. 
Second, the formal feature that unites the activities of this textbook is the basic 
observation that photographic images allow us to contemplate the world's materiality: 
"The writing exercises and opportunities in this book will help you find ways to express 
meaning in the most effective possible ways. The 'meaning' is the result of observation, 
and must include the particular, the specific, the detail" (Look, Think, and Write i; 
boldface in original). The photographs chosen not only provide vision "at its best," but 
also, like all photographs, offer the empirical fullness of a visual scene, and thus an 
opportunity for students to hone their skills of close observation, discrimination, and 
description. Here, we may recall E. B. White's advice that beginning essayists use 
"Definite, Concrete, Specific" language in order to move and persuade the reader. By 
focusing intently on the physical details of a photographic subject, the authors argue, 
students can achieve "clarity, completeness, and accuracy" in their writing (Look, Think, 
and Write 210). According to Leavitt and Sohn, photography provides a nearly noise-free 
channel through which writers can access the physical, sensual world. 
Third, related to the above notion that photography can link visual pleasure to 
literacy, is the belief in photographic literacy as a progressive political act. All 
photographs present "the particular, the specific, the detail," that is, material, physically 
sensible bodies with which the viewer interacts. Even an Ansel Adams landscape 
presents a physical mass, a body of land that produces pleasure. Leavitt and Sohn use this 
sense of visual pleasure to position themselves politically. If students learn to pay close 
19 
attention to the aesthetic and physical "genius" of these perfect photographs, the authors 
write, 
No academician or pedagogue will be able to argue, as they so often do, that 
"pictures" have destroyed the art of thought, and have corrupted language; 
for nobody who has learned to translate accurate, imaginative visual images 
into precise, suggestive language can ever be charged as an enemy of verbal 
expressiveness. (Stop, Look, and Write! 222) 
As others have pointed out (Cope and Kalantzis; George; Kress; Williams, Tuned In), 
resistance to popular culture in the academy was in full bloom by the 1960s, so we see 
here that the authors are defending their project, engaging in their era's quarrel with 
institutional conservatism. The "academician and pedagogue" referred to are probably 
those administrators who do not see the value of photographic literacy learning (though 
it's odd that the writers do not think of themselves as pedagogues). According to this 
argument, photographs are a radical means of achieving certain traditional goals of the 
academy. 
Note the links Leavitt ana Sohn find between politics, pleasure, and photography. 
In the passage above, they imply that the translation of images into words provides for a 
sensual interaction with the mater a world, a kind of bodily pleasure. In their view, a 
photographic pedagogy of literacy pr vides "a way of seeing which will spread through 
an individual's entire life, from think in ; . . . to emotional reactions," which links language 
and affect with the body, with the se if ml facticity of the world. The authors imply, in 
other words, that translating images intc words provides a sensual, pleasurable encounter 
with language and that such pleasure is fundamental to literacy learning. (If we are 
playful, "suggestive language" refers to in evocative description but also a risque remark, 
a hint that leads to the body.) So rather tl IT, corrupting language (Leavitt and Sohn's 
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"corrupt" can mean either a process of decay, of c/ecomposing, or of moral perversion), 
photographs bring life to words. The terms in this passage on pedagogy—"destroyed," 
"corrupted," "charged," "enemy"—reveal a double attack on socially conservative 
notions of education: structurally, in terms of what can be experienced as an object of 
learning (photography animates, does not decompose, language), and politically, in terms 
of the kind of aesthetic restrictions placed on Freshman writing. This use of photography 
makes sensuality and affect an everyday part of Composition pedagogy. Photography 
itself, not simply "the visual" or "expressiveness," surfaces here as a focus of and 
motivation for disciplinary debate. 
This suggests at the very least that photographic pedagogy was from the outset 
positioned against "academicians," that is, those who believed the function of writing 
instruction was to cordon off and teach a well-defined category of language—against 
practitioners of "current-traditional rhetoric," for example. For Leavitt and Sohn, the 
three underlying principles in Stop, Look, and Write! reflected the strength and promise 
of contemporary Composition, and the purchase more liberal curricula had achieved in 
institutions traditionally dominated by conservative, print-based notions of literacy. 
Inversely, these three points would come to epitomize for social theorists in the 
1980s and 90s a weakness in expressivist pedagogy, namely, that it was too concerned 
with the writer's sensual, individual experience, and as a result did not attend to the 
socio-historical problems that had been so forcefully raised throughout the 60s and 70s. 
Social perspectives in Composition, especially cultural criticism, would eventually 
dominate in the field's discussions of the photograph, and the photograph as an affective 
object would seemingly disappear as a relevant theoretical concern. 
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The Visual Revolution in Literacy Studies 
In "From Analysis to Design: Visual Communication in the Teaching of Writing," 
Diana George observes that, while there has been a long-standing interest in making "the 
visual" important to writing instruction, there hasn't been a consistent sense of how to do 
so. This pronouncement will probably ring true for any teacher of writing who has 
seriously pursued an interest in photography. It is now common to talk of the importance 
of the visual and to call for a pedagogy of "multiliteracies" in our textbooks and journals, 
but there is still confusion over the definition of these terms, let alone the role of the 
visual in the classroom. And, George notes, not only is research concerning the 
importance of "visual literacy" in the lives of college students fairly new, but "rarely does 
that call [for a pedagogy of the visual] address students as producers as well as 
consumers or critics of the visual" (14). She argues that what has been missing from 
visual pedagogies is an attention to design, an idea popularized by the New London 
Group.1 This notion of design—the ability to textually and visually interact with, modify, 
and build on the web of meaning that comprises social discourse—reduces the rhetorical 
distance between word and image. In this respect, George's essay is a significant moment 
in the history of Composition, as it challenges us to read the visual as a problem integral 
to contemporary writing instruction. 
Gunther Kress, a member of the New London Group who has been particularly 
interested in the artifacts and contexts of visual communication, offers a more elaborate 
articulation of George's problem: there has been, Kress observes, a "revolution ... in the 
area of communication," which has 
[dislodged] written language from the centrality which it has held, or which 
has been ascribed to it, in public communication. Perhaps the most obvious 
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example is the increasing prominence—dominance even—of the visual in 
many areas of public communication as well. While this is obvious, the 
implications of that shift have not in any sense begun to be drawn out or 
assessed in any coherent, overt, fully conscious, and consistent fashion. 
(Kress 182) 
The Visual Studies texts I have encountered commonly make use of this foundational 
claim—of a revolution whose ramifications are difficult to identify, assess, and apply in 
teaching. It is often the structuring principle in the rhetoric of vision-centric arguments 
(e.g., Hocks; Kligerman; McLuhan; Miholic; Williams, Tuned In), and has been 
prominent in popular philosophical treatments of photography (e.g., Barthes, "The 
Photographic Message" and Camera Lucida; Benjamin, "The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction"; Berger, "Another Way of Telling"; Sontag, On Photography 
and Regarding the Pain of Others). Regardless of this supposed revolution and the rise of 
Visual Studies, however, and for a variety of disciplinary, ideological, and practical 
reasons, photography itself has only rarely been the object of pedagogical or literacy-
based research. 
There is no question that the New London Group (hereafter, the NLG) holds an 
important place in the scholarship of contemporary Composition. Diana George's essay 
marks a strong attachment to the .work of the NLG, most of whom have taken the 
word/image relation as their theoretical focus. Especially relevant to my thinking is the 
work of Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen, who provide a rigorous hermeneutics and 
theory of the way many forms of verbal and visual media intersect to make meaning. In 
brief, the two primary goals of "social semiotics," as Kress and van Leeuwen call their 
work (5), are to expand the definition of literacy to "account for the burgeoning variety of 
text forms associated with information and multimedia technologies," and to foster 
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"understanding and competent control of representational forms that are becoming 
increasingly significant in the overall communications environment, such as visual 
images and their relationship to the written word" (9). With scrupulous attention to the 
subtle but vast range of the semiotic landscape (for example, the color, size and 
placement of font in the image; contrast between its background/foreground; perspective; 
framing; line of sight among characters in the image; and the social context in which the 
image is deployed), social semiotics parses the visual scene, whether photographic 
advertisement, movie still, or sculpture, into readable objects which are shown to serve 
ideological functions. They have compiled a library of strategies and conventions to 
codify and interpret all visual scenes and demonstrate how, in a variety of social spaces, 
public communication is designed to reify or manipulate the structures of power in a 
given social context. 
Diana George draws wholeheartedly from social semiotics. Her historical sketch 
of visual literacy in English and writing classrooms identifies three primary uses of the 
image. First, popular images in the classroom have historically been an implicit threat to 
"high" culture, so they have either been included as a way to introduce belletrism—a 
baby-step toward Great Literature—or in a spirit of resignation, as if they were an 
unavoidable blight to high culture. Images used in such a model were usually "not mere 
popular culture but popular culture in the literary tradition," such as the use of artistic 
prints in James McCrimmon's Writing with a Purpose, as George shows (20). Second, 
after World War II, the communications movement popularized the analysis of ad images 
as an "immunization" against propaganda. In this case, analysis was more concerned with 
identifying the "central argument" of the ad image, and "did not always or consistently 
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include careful consideration of how images, layout, or graphics actually communicated 
meaning" (21). Third, in the 1970s, "expressivist pedagogies," like Leavitt and Sohn's, 
asked students "how a particular image made them feel or of what an image reminded 
them" (22). In all three of these models, George argues, the image is subordinated to 
verbal forms of communication. 
We do not have a coherent theory of the visual, George maintains, because none 
of these models presents the visual as something valuable in and of itself, as an object of 
knowledge that can be a locus of discursive, rhetorical, cultural design—something 
semantically distinct from, but equal in meaning to, written language. By emphasizing 
the concept of design, George provides teachers with a coherent principle of use, "a new 
configuration of verbal/visual relationships ... [that allows] for more than image analysis, 
image-as-prompt, or image-as-dumbed-down language" (32). By asking her students to 
produce "visual arguments" using multiple visual modes, she requires them to make use 
of the complicated systems of signification present in our "aggressively visual culture" 
(15), and to become "producers as well as receivers" of visual media (18)." Only the 
notion of design, George implies, can effectively distinguish between and provide 
coherence to the sundry views on visual literacy. 
The social concept of design—essentially a bridge between visual-textual analysis 
and the production of cultural meaning—is a powerful response to critics such as Maxine 
Hairston, who see in cultural studies the trumpeting of an elitist politics. On the contrary, 
we can see that a pedagogy of design actually promotes rather than ignores the 
connection between theory and classroom practice. But there is still a limitation: in its 
longing to free the image from its subservience to the word, social semiotics has 
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advanced a theoretical model that puts constraints on how we understand and deploy the 
photograph. Note in particular George's critique of "expressivistic pedagogies" (22), 
which she casts aside with little effort. She marks as turning points in our understanding 
of the image with two texts, John Berger's 1972 Ways of Seeing and Bartholomae and 
Petrosky's Ways of Reading Words and Images (2003), which epitomize for her the 
serious beginning of visual literacy in Composition. It is after the publication of this latter 
book, George maintains, that we begin to see the image-text as worthy of specialized 
scholarly attention, an assertion based on faith in the materialistic and semiotic methods 
common to cultural criticism. The methodology practiced by Roland Barthes in 
Mythologies, in which public images are dissected and made to expose and critique 
bourgeois ideology, is the primary, early example of this method. 
So it isn't surprising that, in George's history, the first Composition textbooks to 
treat the visual—such as McCrimmon's Writing with a Purpose and Walker Gibson's 
Seeing and Writing—are termed "expressivistic," a label with which she connotes 
political naivete and self-indulgence, at best (22). This is clearly a misreading of 
Gibson's text, but what is more important to note is George's reason for this designation: 
such textbooks ask students to respond to images affectively.1" She argues that they 
assume "each student [is] an individual who [has] something to say and could find a 
voice with which say it," and that in these books the "focus is clearly on the self (22). 
The implication is that encouraging affective responses to an image does not help 
students see the image "as complex communication intricately related to the world," and 
in fact turns the student away from the historical and ethical dilemmas of our culture (32). 
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This suppression of affect as a pedagogical concern has produced a Visual Studies that 
leans heavily on an impoverished historical materialism for its way of seeing. 
By entering the discussion of the visual from this perspective, George has pushed 
aside alternative means of understanding the photograph. All visual objects are 
considered alike in their ability to be turned toward cultural critique. "Visual Studies," 
which concerns itself with understanding and manipulating all things visual, holds a 
tyrannical sway over otherwise distinct modes of visual representation, and tends to elide 
the unique qualities of the medium that theorists and practitioners of photography have 
been grappling with for over a century. This is not unique to George's proposal but is 
built into the social pedagogies that ground her argument. Ironically, David Bartholomae 
and Anthony Petrosky's Ways of Reading Words and Images, which deals exclusively 
with essays on photography, is an exception among more socially-oriented approaches. 
The assignments that ask students to critically read photographs are evocative, promising 
a deep engagement with both the production and analysis of photography. However, their 
assignments that ask students to use actual photographs sometimes seem like 
afterthoughts, rather than vigorous engagements with the medium.lv Other textbooks, 
such as Anne Wysocki and Dennis Lynch's Compose, Design, Advocate, offer wonderful 
activities with actual photographs (see their chapter entitled "Analyzing Documentary 
Photography"); but again, such textbooks tend to downplay photography's 
epistemological quirks and idiosyncrasies, in order to address a wider range of visual and 
verbal media.v More often than not, references to photographic analysis have followed 
the model outlined by social semiotics. 
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George implies that the concept of design separates her pedagogy from earlier 
models of cultural criticism, but a glance at these models reveals her affinity with them. 
To cite one important example, Joel Foreman and David Shumway, in "Cultural Studies: 
Reading Visual Texts," define a visual text as any image, photographic or not, which 
must be decoded "in much the same way that the letters or words on the page of a 
document are decoded" (245). For Foreman and Shumway, the fact that we can scan and 
understand immediately the import of a magazine advertisement demonstrates how 
deeply and intricately involved these pictures are with culture. In order for students to 
analyze such images, they need "to be informed about the process and relations of 
production that resulted" in this particular combination of signs (246), and must possess a 
"particular interpretive perspective," which for these authors is Althusserian (247). 
For Foreman and Shumway, in other words, ideology is profoundly unconscious, 
and so the everyday act of looking (at advertisements, especially) is actually a process of 
being blinded by and to ideology. They observe, with Althusser, that even the conflicts 
that naturally exist within ideology are hidden. They assert that their theoretical 
framework provides a way to break through ideology, a way in—which is to say, a way 
to keep ideology out, or in Charles Paine's words, a means of "inoculating" (The 
Resistant Writer: Rhetoric as Immunity 12)VI students against its infectious powers to 
blind, and thus allowing for progressive civic action: 
Because the media are not absolutely controlled, and more importantly, 
representations themselves are too polymorphous to be rigorously limited, 
contradictions to the dominant interests are a part of culture: [quoting 
Catherine Belsey] "The role of ideology is to suppress these contradictions in 
the interests of the preservation of the existing social formation, but their 
presence ensures that it is always possible, with whatever difficulty, to 
identify them, to recognize ideology for what it is, and to take an active part 
in transforming it by producing new meanings." (248, second emphasis mine) 
28 
The authors essentially ask students to approach textual criticism as an act of social 
design, as George does, though they rely more on a word-based disassembling and 
reassembling of cultural images, a confextaalizing of images. Overall, they want to "help 
students read their culture critically and thus to produce new meanings that resist 
ideology" (261). For Foreman and Shumway, and for the NLG, all image-texts that come 
before the analyst—including those registered not only by language and consciousness, 
but also by the body (see endnote ii)—ultimately expose themselves to being read, used, 
and redesigned along the lines of a materialist critique. 
If the so-called expressivists lost sight of the photograph's potential for political 
engagement, those in cultural studies lost sight of the photograph as an affective object. 
Using rather broad strokes/" we can sketch two fundamental assumptions about Cultural 
Studies in Composition: (1) language is always a social phenomenon, and (2) visual units 
of meaning are readily put to the same ideological use as linguistic units. As classroom 
practice has revealed to many of us, this understanding works particularly well when 
analyzing public photographs, especially advertising images. But there is a pronounced 
absence in most cultural studies pedagogies of interest in the photograph as an entity with 
intimate connections to the affective lives of individuals. With few exceptions, the social 
view has treated all images as readable texts (though sometimes devious ones), and their 
function in the web of signification as precisely decipherable and turned toward ethical, 
political criticism. But this requires certain methodological restrictions. The apparent 
fascination or dread induced by certain photographs—what Barthes late in his career calls 
a photograph'spunctum, its "astonishment" (Camera Lucida 27 and 82)—is disregarded 
as a byproduct of ideological blindness. That is, nothing exceeds a critical reader's 
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interpretive framework. No residue of meaning remains after interpretation; everything 
worthwhile (everything politically salient) has been spoken. It seems that affect itself 
becomes theoretically invisible. 
More than any other point of contention in the field, I believe this one most 
forcefully separates expressivistic and cultural studies approaches. I again turn to Kress 
and van Leeuwen to demonstrate how deeply the role of affect divides approaches to the 
acts of looking and analysis. In an early collaborative essay, "Trampling All Over Our 
Unspoilt Spot: Barthes' 'Punctum' and the Politics of the Extrasemiotic," the authors 
undertake the tricky proposition of claiming Roland Barthes as an important intellectual 
ancestor (in Mythologies) but simultaneously of disclaiming his conception of the 
photograph (especially in Camera Lucida). Kress and van Leeuwen make no secret about 
their debt to Barthes' semiotics. On the other hand, they move vehemently away from his 
sense of the photograph as an affectively charged object that disturbs the systematic 
application of semiotic analysis. 
To understand this avoidance on the part of Kress and van Leeuwen, it is 
important to recognize that from even his earliest publications, Barthes saw the 
photograph as a challenge to the traditional practice of semiotics. In agreement with 
Walter Benjamin's contention that camera technology has revolutionized the way the 
public experiences the act of looking, Barthes suspects that photography revolutionizes 
human consciousness. All written communication consists of a logical set of codes that 
link what is really in front of our eyes (the denotative message) with what should or 
might be seen (the connotative message). However, a photograph's denotative message 
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bears no "code" out of which to transmit its connotative message, as does written 
language. Barthes' explanation is worth quoting at length: 
Of all the structures of information, the photograph appears as the only one 
that is exclusively constituted and occupied by a 'denoted' message, a 
message which totally exhausts its mode of existence. In front of a 
photograph, the feeling of "denotation," or, if one prefers, of analogical 
plenitude, is so great that the description of the photograph is literally 
impossible; to describe consists precisely in joining to the denoted message a 
relay or second-order message derived from a code which is that of language 
and constituting in relation to the photographic analogue, however much care 
one takes to be exact, a connotation: to describe is thus not simply to be 
imprecise or incomplete, it is to change structures, to signify something 
different from what is shown. (1977, 18) 
Many visual modes of representation, such as painting, theater, or cinema, transmit their 
connotative meanings (the style of the image, which signifies a period or a region, the 
"art" and rhetoric of the image) almost simultaneously with their denotative 
("analogical") meanings, "in an immediate and obvious way," Barthes argues (PM17). 
Photography, on the other hand, paradoxically delivers its meaning only after it has been 
attended to by the cultural and grammatical codes of language. The "connoted (or coded) 
message" of a photograph, as Barthes phrases this paradox, "develops on the basis of a 
message without a code" (19). 
This passage complicates Kress and van Leeuwen's attempt to sift out Barthes' 
fascination with visual pleasure from his materialist hermeneutics. While they "concur 
with Barthes in affirming the real, the authentic" ("without it," they write, "semiotics is 
cast adrift in fashionable postmodern uncertainty," 37), they are anxious about his claim 
"that the description of the photograph is literally impossible" (their words, not his), 
sensing in his love for certain photographs an attempt to protect certain discourses from 
critical analysis, especially discourses that touch upon visual pleasure and aesthetics in 
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general (37). This accusation of elitism is especially strong in their reading of Camera 
Lucida, where they see in Barthes' punctum an attempt to set off aesthetic territory upon 
which semioticians cannot "trample" (36). 
It seems nothing escapes their analysis. They assert that "everything the 
semiotician touches turns into the semiotic" and aim their Midas touch at Barthes' text, 
warning us of the moral threat implicit in his turn against semiotics. Oddly enough, Kress 
and van Leeuwen suggest that student writing in particular is threatened by Barthes' 
notion of the extrasemiotic. Speaking of the "specific [detrimental] political effects" (37) 
of the idea of the punctum, they look toward the college writing course: "if 'the best 
writing' is inexplicable within the banality of semiotic terms, the teaching of writing in 
schools can only hope to reproduce an elite which has access to the constitution of 
writing by other means" (38). This implies that the uncritical acceptance of photographic 
pleasure furthers an unjust, inequitable society. This argument implies, in other words, 
that only social semiotics can help writing pedagogy deal ethically with the image. 
The aspirations of this claim will be a bit confusing for any teacher who does not 
use semiotic terms in the teaching of writing. I occasionally do, and still find this 
confusing—the assumption that denying "the social, the semiotic ... is the currently 
dominant and most damaging myth" (38). What gets damaged? According to the authors, 
it is social justice, undermined by the elusive mysticism of Barthes' language of 
"escape," his skill with writing hidden beneath the "magic" of photography (Camera 
Lucida 88). But a close reading of Barthes does not expose, to this reader, an oppressive 
bourgeois academic hoping to fend off the illiterate masses. Barthes launches an 
audacious attack on semiotic theory as it is usually practiced in the academy. Kress and 
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van Leeuwen rightly point out that whatever is extra-semiotic can be looked at by the 
semiotician, codified, analyzed, and interpreted according to an elaborate, systematized 
discourse. There is no reason to think Barthes would disagree. But they have missed or 
ignored the significance of affect—in Barthes' words, "desire, repulsion, nostalgia, 
euphoria, ... mourning" (21), "love, compassion, grief, enthusiasm" (113)—which is 
central to so much of Barthes' thinking and, one might assume, to everyday life.vm If 
anything has been damaged, it is the strength of Composition theory to address this 
capricious, accidental, adventurous aspect of looking at photographs. 
The Photograph Returns; Affect and the Puncturing of Semiotic Perspective 
To ask whether a photograph is analogical or coded is not a good means of 
analysis. The important thing is that the photograph possesses an evidential 
force, and that its testimony bears not on the object but on time. From a 
phenomenological viewpoint, in the Photograph, the power of authentication 
exceeds the power of representation. 
—Barthes, Camera Lucida (88-89) 
In Camera Lucida Barthes attempts to find the "genius" of the photograph, the 
"essential feature" by which it can "be distinguished from the community of images" (3). 
He employs the analytical insights of semiotics to understand the medium but also pays 
close attention to the affective spark (the punctum) produced by certain images. More 
specifically, Barthes begins with a private goal: he desires a way to extract, from a large 
stash of old family photos, the essence or "unique being" of his mother, who had died just 
before he began writing this, his last book. The results of his search explain his 
distinction between a photograph's studium, which comprises all the information about 
history and culture in a photo that allows us to make general sense of it, and its punctum, 
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which is the emotional disturbance caused when certain details in a photograph trigger an 
unconscious association in the viewer—an accident or adventure of looking, an 
unexpected puncture or punctuation of one's look (26-27). The idea of the punctum 
allows Barthes to account for a subtle, fleeting, nearly inexplicable moment of looking at 
photographs that is often excluded from the gaze of social semiotics. 
In the narrative climax of Camera Lucida, Barthes writes of perusing a shoebox 
of old family snapshots after his mother had died, hoping to find photos of her that could 
communicate her "essence." At first, this search produced no true recognition. "I never 
recognized her except in fragments [that is, familiar poses and facial expressions], which 
is to say that I missed her being, and that therefore I missed her altogether" (65-66). After 
days of disappointment, however, he finally found what he calls "the Winter Garden 
Photograph," an image of his mother as a child. Taken by an anonymous photographer, it 
exists for him as 
a supererogatory photograph which contained more than what the technical 
being of photography can reasonably offer.... I could not express [my 
simultaneous elation at finding this image] and my grief at her death ... 
except by an infinite series of adjectives, which I omit, convinced however 
that this photograph collected all possible predicates from which my mother's 
being was constituted. ... The Winter Garden Photograph was indeed 
essential, it achieved for me, utopically, the impossible science of the unique 
being. (71, italics in original) 
Barthes strives here for an understanding of subjectivity that can grasp the elusive 
moment of being pierced by such an image—not because of any apparent anxiety about 
low-brow culture or the disenfranchised, but because conventional semiotics ignores 
these feelings and sensations, which are so central to the experience of being moved by a 
photograph. That is, the Winter Garden Photograph stages an "extrasemiotic" moment of 
precisely the sort Kress and van Leeuwen fear and disdain. Its semiotic analysis is, 
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indeed, partially non-interpretable, due to this paradoxical fact: it highlights a child's 
enduring attachment to his deceased parent, but also the irrationality of this attachment. 
"She is lost," the photograph announces. But also, "She continues to exist." Barthes uses 
this melancholic encounter to define the genius of photography: it is a visual technology 
that powerfully confirms life and death, presence and absence, at the same time. We can 
say that the punctum of a photograph expresses what is hinted at but absent, what is 
pointed at but not shown, in the image. The desire of social semiotics to derive only 
positive information from visual analysis would force us to ignore or disavow this aspect 
of photography. If the camera can produce affective disturbances such as Barthes 
describes, then every photograph is a potential memento mori, a shard from the past that 
can call a viewer to meditate on the paradoxically entwined forces of loss and presence, 
of past and present. It can thus provide positive cultural data but sometimes also 
profoundly disturb one's ability to distinguish positively between reality then and reality 
now. 
We don't have to be ensnared in grief to grasp the technical accuracy and 
philosophical ingenuity of this definition. 
Technically, there is an essential confusion in the semiosis of photography each 
time the camera's shutter is operated. Light bounces off the subject and enters the 
aperture of the camera, imprinting on the film or the image-sensor the precise physical 
contours (of a landscape, a face, a body) seen in front of the camera's lens. This allows 
for two claims: (1) the photograph is an icon that stands in for (represents) an absent 
image, idea, or person; (2) it is also an index, an object which points to and gives 
presence to its subject. More specifically, the photo as icon is a representation of the 
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subject (distant from the subject itself), like a painted portrait, made up of a series of 
gestures (that is, having certain aesthetic intentions; made from a certain angle and with a 
certain depth of field, with a precise focal setting, exposure time, contrast, hue and 
saturation; framed and perhaps captioned) that can often be historicized and ideologically 
"decoded." (Many images by Ansel Adams, for example, might be seen as icons of the 
"natural" "American" "landscape.") But a photo is also an indexical piece of the subject, 
like "palm prints, death masks, cast shadows, the Shroud of Turin, or the tracks of gulls 
on beaches," as Rosalind Krauss puts it (L 'Amour Fou: Photography and Surrealsim 31). 
The photographic process, because of its machine-precise channeling of light, allows us 
to confront reality in a way that is impossible for non-photographic visual modes. No 
"painted portrait," Barthes writes, "supposing that it seemed 'true' to me, could compel 
me to believe its referent had really existed" (77). In the photograph, on the other hand, it 
is "not a question of exactitude, but of reality," for the photograph is "literally an 
emanation of the referent" (80): a "sort of umbilical cord links the body of the 
photographed thing to my gaze: light, though impalpable, is here a carnal medium, a skin 
I share with anyone who has been photographed" (81). This explains why only 
photography seems to achieve "the impossible science of the unique being.",x 
Philosophically: photography's icon/index dualism calls for a new approach to the 
old boundary between reality and representation. To understand this claim, it is crucial to 
understand the relation of present time to historical time. In her reading of Plato's 
allegory of the cave, Susan Sontag wrote that the camera seems to fragment a sense of 
history as continuous and ongoing—it promotes a world view "which denies 
interconnectedness, continuity, but which confers on each moment the character of a 
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mystery," just as fire and shadows make reality discontinuous and mystifying for Plato's 
cave dwellers (On Photography 23)—and for this reason photography isn't capable of 
moral instruction. Sontag insisted that only "that which narrates can make us 
understand," meaning that understanding require a sense of duration, of anecdotes, stories 
and arguments unfolding over time. Photography, she wrote, makes it difficult to 
remember that our lives in the present are contiguous with what we know or sense as 
"History." Barthes, on the other hand, sees this ability to fragment history as the camera's 
greatest strength. "History is a memory fabricated according to positive formulas, a pure 
intellectual discourse which abolishes mythic Time," he writes, whereas "the Photograph 
is a certain but fugitive testimony" (93). That is, photography can bear witness to the 
fragility of subjective experience, which is generally invisible to positive (positivistic) 
narratives of historical progress. 
This resonates with John Berger and Jean Mohr's argument in Another Way of 
Telling. Barthes' Berger and Mohr speak of "summit moments," akin to Barthes' 
punctum, in a human life ("moments of achievement, trance, dream, passion, ... prowess, 
near-death, sacrifice, mourning"), which "are intrinsic to the relation imagination/time" 
(106). Like the punctum, these moments cut across the seamless narrative coherence of 
"historical progress," which, Berger and Mohr assert, has done "deep violence ... to 
subjective experience" (107). Fortunately, "people are never only the passive objects of 
history" (108). Given this phrasing, it isn't surprising that they embrace personal 
photographs as an important part of the ethical imagination: "Hundreds of millions of 
photographs, fragile images, often carried next to the heart or placed by the side of the 
bed, are used to refer to that which historical time has no right to destroy" (108). Note 
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that Berger, whose Ways of Reading has been portrayed as the ground zero of critical 
Visual Studies in Composition, here provides a bracing critique of any visual ethics that 
disregards personal images. Furthermore, against Sontag's demand for a coherent 
narrative of moral instruction, Berger contends that "a photograph's lack of intentionality 
becomes its strength, its lucidity" (125), and that it offers "a coherence which, instead of 
narrating, instigates ideas" (128). 
In brief, Barthes and Berger insist that photographs, especially but not exclusively 
personal images, can be catalysts for ethical thought. This goes against the prevailing 
logic of social semiotics, where an emphasis on "the personal" is usually seen as an 
avoidance of larger social and historical problems. On the contrary, personal photographs 
create a visual space that can salvage individual subjectivity from the crushing anonymity 
of history. The positivistic historical data that photographs produce have frequently been 
used to identify, manage, and even to "frame" (i.e., to misrepresent and wrongfully 
accuse) individuals. It has also "framed" individuals within views of history that seem to 
erase subjective experience. As Laura Wexler puts it, although photography has the 
power to destroy lives, it also bears the "capacity to envision" new ones: "The right to see 
and be seen, in one's own way and under one's own terms, has been [domestic 
photography's] point of contention" (299). By situating affect as a significant part of our 
relationship with photography, Barthes and Berger show us that we can make personal 
images speak back to and resist positivistic misuses of the camera. This is as much to say 
that any photograph, even one from a family album, can become a political device, in as 
much as it can weaken historical narratives that tend to reduce and marginalize subjective 
experience. 
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The idea that personal photos have some sort of political or critical value is not 
universally accepted in Composition Studies. For example, in "Photography: A Writer's 
Tool for Thinking, Rendering, and Revising," Vincent Miholic uses only "public" 
photographs to help students sharpen their critical thinking skills. He wants to make use 
of the analogical plenitude of the medium (i.e., all the details visual scene), but imposes 
strict limits on the kind of images to be used, refusing "autobiographical" photos in 
particular. He implies that autobiographical images resist critical thinking: "While old 
photographs are potent archives for autobiographical reflection, the primary function of 
the camera and the photographic process is to aid the eye and mind in seeing differently" 
(26). This seems to me an unnecessarily restrictive understanding of the medium and of 
autobiography. In the first place, any photograph can be used to establish uniformity in 
public perception, and can work against critical thinking. This is the function of 
propaganda, of much advertising, and probably of much journalistic and documentary 
photography. Secondly, autobiographical images also have a long history of introducing 
difference into public vision. A case in point is the work of visual artists who collect 
anonymous personal photos and, by juxtaposing them in large collections of similar 
images, create a disorienting sense of the human being as an image-collecting animal 
(e.g., Christian Boltanski's found images in his "Lessons of Darkness," and Joachim 
Schmid's "Photographic Garbage Survey Project"). In such contexts, personal images are 
used to profound rhetorical effect, altering the viewer's sense of how photography 
reflects or refracts "reality." 
Miholic is suspicious of the autobiographical impulse—charged as it is with affect 
and too many subjective world views—and worried about the ethical value of personal 
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photography. This anxiety can be sensed in much of the pedagogy of cultural studies. But 
Composition scholars are increasingly using both personal photographs and 
autobiography to encourage progressive social thought. For instance, Wendy Hesford 
begins her book, Framing Identities: Autobiography and the Politics of Pedagogy, with a 
thorough and compelling analysis of a nineteenth-century photo of her great-grandfather. 
A young, sober-faced white man sits in a small, domestic space and gazes with 
"detachment" into the distance (3). Next to him stands a black youth who stares directly 
into the camera, and who, we are made to assume, is a servant to the seated man. 
Regarding her own description of this image, Hesford writes that "its focus on what can 
be seen could be interpreted as a controlling act that reinforces the domestic order of the 
room.... Yet what is not seen is as much a part of the context of the photograph as what is 
seen" (3). In other words, rather than simply repeating the detached, dominating gaze of 
Western imperialism, Hesford draws out of this image a retrospective act of historical 
resistance. Under her critical gaze, the power of the photograph to stop time flickers, and 
the image speaks out against itself. What is not seen becomes vital. The visual traces of 
imperialism—the young white man's detached posture, the black youth's attentive gaze, 
the difference between their clothing—are fractured and made to betray their historical 
origins, and the picture's "other," the black youth, has suddenly become a subject, one 
whose gaze ferociously returns our own. Hesford demonstrates that this practice of 
inverting the gaze has ethical implications for how we commemorate the past. She shows 
how the image of her great-grandfather and of the boy "monumentalized, 
commemorated, and reproduced an idealized image of [her] family and its value" (6). 
This family image now marks a dark spot in Hesford's sense of her personal history, but 
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it is a blemish that radiates a fuller knowledge of her "shifting roles as author—great-
granddaughter and keeper of the tales (a generational space that involves feelings of 
betrayal as much as pride), teacher, and social critic—and the cultural and social 
narratives that shape [her] authorial location" (4). 
We find a rather different approach to photographs in the work of Tom Romano. 
Though Romano's main area of research has been multi-genre writing, he offers specific 
insights into photography. Romano defines multi-genre writing as "a complex, 
multilayered, multi-voiced blend of genres, each revealing information about [the 
writer's] topic, each self-contained, making a point of its own, unconnected to other 
genres by conventional transitional devices" (4). Such writing consists of "genre 
snapshots," an indication of his fondness for photography (4), which are produced by 
showing not telling—a phrase used to describe the imaginative recasting of visual 
experience. Vision precedes the multi-genre essay. In seemingly diametric opposition to 
the social view, in which all images are "turned into" text, Romano encourages peeling 
back written text to reveal a sequence of photographs. 
A photograph is only one more "genre snapshot" in this model, albeit a rare and 
suggestive one. A photograph may be all there is to say about a topic, Romano suggests, 
but when necessary, students can also "use a photograph as a creative springboard to dive 
deeply with language into a topic" (100). Photos provide a mysterious, fruitful kind of 
tension when placed next to (when rubbing against) language, inciting an inexplicable 
pleasure, an adventure, in writing: "The very act of using language to describe the image 
often leads the writer to surprising perceptions and understanding" (100). Word and 
image are placed next to each other in importance and on the page. For Romano, the 
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photographic image is joined with the written text to provide a richer, more poignant, 
detail-saturated narrative that exceeds the power that either medium can achieve on its 
own. 
This Process-oriented understanding of the photograph is also related to Barthes' 
notion of the punctum. Romano confirms this when he says: "Genres of narrative 
thinking require writers to be concrete and precise. They can't just tell in abstract 
language. ... They must show. They must make their topics palpable. They must 
penetrate'''' (26; my emphasis after tell). On this understanding of the photograph, the 
body is linked to an erotics of vision. Tom Newkirk connects "spectatorship" even more 
explicitly with "pleasure," which is "rooted," he writes, "in perception more than 
conception, in the visual more than the intellectual, in looking outward more than inward, 
in amusement and delight more than in self-improvement" (The Performance of Self 73). 
This might explain why so much Process pedagogy readily accepts the photograph as a 
distinct form of representation, and why critical pedagogies are suspicious of it: pleasure 
taken in visual forms resembles voyeurism, and voyeurism is a perversity that seems to 
run counter to the goals and tenor of progressive social action. But Romano's and 
Newkirk's "sensualist" approach differs significantly from voyeurism or crude hedonism. 
The pleasure they take in looking is completely open and communal, intended to be 
shared and transmitted in academic settings. For this pragmatic approach, pleasure has a 
payoff—its ability to get the largest number of students to look, and look closely, at 
material reality. In this sense an erotics of vision is also a social program. 
It seems that this social impulse toward visual pleasure is ancient. The 
photograph, Andre Bazin wrote, is an object that triggers a primal desire for reality in the 
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realm of the image. Bazin speculated that this psychic demand for the corporeal body in 
our representations (he calls it the "mummy-complex") has driven the creation of visual 
art throughout history. This would not only explain why the invention of photography so 
nearly coincided with the birth of impressionistic painting—that is, because the camera 
made Renaissance realism in painting unnecessary—but also why ancient religions 
created small representations of the human form to be placed in the tomb alongside the 
corpse and for other funereal rites. "The religion of ancient Egypt, aimed against death," 
Bazin writes, "saw survival as depending on the continued existence of the corporeal 
body" (237). Bazin further observes that "the Holy Shroud of Turin combines features 
alike of relic and photograph" (244). That is, religion and art are both driven by a 
compulsion for "the flesh," which the camera gives. To push this one step further, since 
every funeral is a social experience, and every photograph is funereal, then every 
photograph takes part in a social experience—though a strange and liminal one, marked 
by the ambiguities of loss and presence. 
Between Hesford's socio-personal criticism and Romano's sensualist 
communalism, we have two very different approaches to photography. But they share an 
interest in the photo as a unique rhetorical space, one that merges language, the image, 
affect, and an actual piece of the past. Hesford's use of her family image opens a space 
that shows us how imperialism in the past shaped her personal life in the present. 
Romano's images help us imagine the affective lives of his students and ask us to connect 
those lives to the lives of other students in future classrooms. This suggests that both 
approaches use flat, two-dimensional photos to create a multi-dimensional rhetoric that 
welds social modes of being with modes that are undoubtedly highly personal. The 
43 
particular photographs Hesford and Romano have chosen to discuss, and the way they 
discuss them, combine affect with social awareness, in a way that remains sensitive to the 
unique rhetorical needs of each writer. This is exactly what I hope writing students can 
get from a photo-pedagogy—a sense of their subjective experiences somehow 
accumulating around the image, of a past coming to life, and of new narrative and 
rhetorical possibilities emerging. 
I don't intend this chapter to vilify social semiotics, but only to point out that 
there is an essential (ontological and epistemological) feature of photography that often 
goes unaddressed. We don't need a highly specialized discourse to understand this 
essential feature. People who have grown up around photographs are likely to have an 
ingrained sense of it. Broadly characterized, it is that a photograph creates the feeling of a 
link between the local and the universal, the physical and the metaphysical, the banal and 
the mysterious. Of all modes of representation that are both icons and indices—death 
masks, thumbprints, holy relics—the photo is the most popular. 
This is to say that looking at photographs, even privately, is a communal event. In 
the making of pictures, in their critical (academic) reception, and even in their passive 
reception, photography is social. We encounter it, with varying degrees of awareness, in 
particular places and particular social contexts. I first encountered camera work in the 
1970s, when my father started taking pictures as a hobby. My family spent many nights 
sitting on the couch in our darkened living room, listening to the whir and click of the 
slide projector as image after image cast light and shadows around the room: cloudscapes 
outside the window of the airplane my dad chartered; an old woman crossing the street; 
Biackie, the family dog, jumping into the ocean; my sisters and I playing on the beach. 
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We laughed occasionally as my father narrated the parade of images, or when my mother 
cracked a joke; but mostly we just sat together and looked. Of course, this is only one of 
many ways private viewers absorb photography as a social event. I myself was not 
seriously interested in taking pictures myself until my son was born. Then it became 
something of an obsession, a ferociously powerful impulse to produce images of him, 
which were then avidly shared with everybody around me. 
This is an anecdotal way of suggesting that when teachers ask how students feel 
about a picture, we are not looking for a solipsistic response, as George implies is the 
case with expressivistic pedagogies. It is simply a way of finding the social dimensions of 
personal experience. A pedagogy of photography asks students to "go public" with their 
notions of what is beautiful, repulsive, melancholy, or joyful, in order to achieve a fuller 
understanding of how, and to what ends, visual culture operates in their lives. 
Conversely, our critical examinations of popular photography help us better understand 
private experience. This approach to photo pedagogy is grounded in the belief that 
prioritizing the personal dimension of experience over the social, or vice versa, does not 
do justice to the holistic nature of our intellectual and affective lives. Both dimensions are 
fully collaborative, both can be explored with creative and critical strategies, and work in 
one dimension leads us to reflect on the other. 
The Social Practice of Private Looking: A Photo Essay Project in Four Parts 
To help students engage this kind of intellectual/affective/communal work, I have 
a four-part assignment that investigates the relation of public photographs to private ways 
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of looking. The entire project is broken into two halves. The first half has to do explicitly 
with looking at and making photographs, the second half is the writing. 
Part 1 of the assignment asks students to bring to class three different definitions 
of art, from whatever three sources they can find. I ask them to type this up and to include 
an end comment that explains which definition they find most persuasive, and why. They 
are encouraged to peruse online archives to get a sense of which images they find most 
"art-like." (I offer starter sites—www.metmuseum.org, www.moma.org, 
www.artcyclopedia.com, www.0100101110101101.org, www.photomontage.com, 
www.illegal-art.org, www.rhizome.org—but they usually find more on their own.) After 
we've discussed their definitions of art in class, I introduce them to four artists who mark 
significant moments in modern photography: Gertrude Kasebier (Pictorialism), Imogen 
Cunningham (the "Straight" photography of Group f/64), Robert Frank (The Americans), 
and William Eggleston (William Eggleston 's Guide). A large number of their 
photographs can be found online, so with a laptop and internet access we can view them 
in class. If the classroom is not set up with an A/V connection, the photographers' books 
can simply be passed around. This, however, is a poor compromise, since looking at the 
images together confirms the social nature of our work. 
The overall goals of this project are for students to think seriously about their 
aesthetic predispositions, and to start writing about the visual world in such a way that 
these predispositions become an open question rather than a matter of unfounded opinion. 
Beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, but this sentiment is fairly useless for 
understanding why one image strikes us as more beautiful (or repulsive or boring) than 
another. 
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This is where the four photographers come in. Sequenced in the way they're listed 
above, they provide a nice illustration of a few important aesthetic shifts in America— 
from Pictorialism in the 1920s, to "straight" photography in the 30s, to Frank's quirky 
focusing, low lighting, and cynical take on America in the 50s, and finally to the 
saturated colors and thematic banality of Eggleston's campy 1970s America. While each 
of these moments are historically important, this brief chronology gets most interesting 
with Eggleston, who is widely considered to have legitimized color photography as an art 
form. Most students tend to see black-and-white as the more appropriate mode for camera 
art. They also tend to see Eggleston's images as boring at first, since they often focus on 
mundane places and objects: an uneventful front door with a basket of flowers hanging 
on the knocker; the dingy gray exterior of what might be a deserted building; a close-up 
of an open oven; a jacket clumsily hanging on a dirty wall. (Go to 
http://www.egglestontrust.com to peruse a few images from Eggleston's collected 
works.) 
By looking carefully, however, we are able to notice some rather striking things 
about Eggleston's style. We begin to see that the contrast and texture we lost in going 
from black-and-white to color, is replaced by a vibrant visual dynamic that makes the 
images almost menacing. Also, as John Szarkowski writes in the introduction to William 
Eggleston's Guide, we begin to see "a style not inappropriate for photographs that might 
be introduced as evidence in court" (11). In their banality, we find a simplicity that 
begins to transform into complexity. And yet, as Barthes and others have pointed out, 
these photographs do not speak. To "translate these appearances into words is surely a 
fool's errand," Szarkowski writes, and "no two fools would choose the same 
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unsatisfactory words" (12). Eggleston's photographs don't have a narrative or a moral. 
They seem instead to exist for the sake of existing, as if form and content were 
synonymous (10-12), and as if "verbal descriptions are finally gratuitous" (13). But 
Szarkowski keeps moving, keeps offering his words, teaching us that to write is to accept 
the challenge photography gives us, to dance with it rather than be silenced by it. There is 
no progressive social commentary he can pull from these photographs, finding in them 
instead "the familiar modern vices" and some "of the ancient ones" as well. "This could 
not be called progress," he realizes, "but it is interesting" (14). 
But there is a kind of progress here. When students engage this conversation 
about the intersection of form (saturated colors, banal Composition) and content (the 
gritty, plastic, neon landscape of post-60s Americana), they must grapple with social 
aesthetics from a personal perspective. And they must open their private views to the 
aesthetic "paradigms" that constitute art production in America (Eggleston 14). Not all 
students come to enjoy Eggleston's images (most do), but the point is that we collectively 
interrogate and stir up our notions of beauty and art. Indeed, I may talk with students 
about how these photographs make them feel, but also about where these feelings come 
from (the depth of subjective experience) and what the subjective experience of looking 
at the images can build (an American Imaginary). That is, there is progress because 
Eggleston's work is interesting. By taking pleasure in looking at and conversing about 
these images, we are learning how to feel about them, to immerse ourselves in their 
affective contexts. And, of course, we are learning to take a rhetorical position, as 
Szarkowski did so profoundly, amidst the ocean of images filling our visual universe. 
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Part 2 of this assignment requires students to make their own pictures. They will 
take pictures of people, things, and spaces on campus. Looked at together and in a certain 
sequence, these images should reveal the Zeitgeist of university life, as each student sees 
it. We begin by discussing the formal aspects of the photographs we've observed. Since 
not all students have access to expensive cameras—most use their cell phones, the rest 
purchase disposables—I restrict this instruction to light and framing, two formal 
properties which do not require sophisticated technical equipment. 
Light 
This is our first and most important technical discussion. We think about the 
different types of light and the different ways in which they can both challenge and 
benefit the photographer. 
(1) Bright light: the sun is at its highest, providing neither a distinct light source 
nor distinct shadows. 
(2) Directional light: there is bright light but also deep shadow. 
(3) Diffuse light: there is a range of difference between light and shadow. 
(4) Artificial light: tends to be very dim or, with direct flash, too harsh. "There 
are two kinds of light," James Thurber wrote, "the glow that illuminates, and the glare 
that obscures." Understanding this distinction is the backbone of camera work. 
Framing and Composition 
The scene through a camera's viewfinder is not immediately meaningful. For 
somebody not used to that cramped view of the world, it can look like an indiscriminate 
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fog of visual information. The usual way to make an image meaningful is to place its 
subject right in the center of the frame. This method, common to birthday parties and 
vacations to foreign cities, is meant to record an event, not to sustain or challenge a 
viewer's gaze. As soon as we pay attention to the space around the subject, however, we 
have started composing. A few things to remember about framing: 
(1) The Rule of Thirds. Imagine that the photograph's visual space is divided into 
three equal parts by two sets of parallel lines—one set horizontal, the other vertical 
(basically an invisible tic-tac-toe board). This produces four intersecting points. Place the 
subject of the photo on one of these four, off-set points. Not centering the subject of the 
photo can make it more interesting by creating visual "tension." Move the camera around 
just slightly between exposures to see the difference this makes in overall composition. 
What activates the corners of the image, and what is in the middle? 
(2) Patterns and symmetries. Try to guide the viewer's attention around the space 
of the image. Where are the leading lines? Can you find diagonals, triangles, circles, or 
ovals that draw the eye toward your subject? Use these lines and geometries to create a 
sense of movement. 
(3) Depth of field. How does the difference between foreground and background 
emphasize your subject? Think in terms of layers. Can an object in the background frame 
something in the foreground, and vice versa? 
(4) Experiment with blank space, which can be just as effective as filled space in 
managing the image's spatial relationships. 
We are now ready to start taking pictures. Here is a fun assignment which helps 
students try on the aesthetic ideas we've been discussing. 
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Sample Assignment #1 
Making Pictures for Essay #1: Photography Scavenger Hunt 
Make at least 90 exposures, 10 per category, and choose the single best from each category to 
bring to class. This means you'll bring in 9 images total. Don't forget to do the cliche! 
1) A cliche 
2) Portrait of a gentleman 
Portrait of a lady 
Self-portrait featuring reflections 
3) An artist at work 
An administrator wearing funny glasses but not posing 
People in the wrong place (at the right time?) 
A philosopher being stumped 
4) A picture within a picture 
The word "keystone" 
A person holding a camera who doesn't know they're being photographed 
5) A large animal or Poppin' Fresh or Bibendum 
A gun 
A physics classroom or chalkboard 
An organized space 
6) Something upside-down 
A locker room or a bathroom 
A change in time 
7) Three people in the frame, all doing different things 
A happy person who does not look happy 
A transaction, or a person eating 
A person who looks like somebody famous, but make us guess who the famous person is 
8) An interesting corner 
A tree that looks like a person flying 
A person made out of paper clips or matches 
Weather 
9) Something that does not make any sense 
An important item 
An empty house or building 
Distorted scale 
A tangle of limbs 
A recurring dream 
Fig. 1. Sample Assignment #1 
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The scavenger hunt lets students experiment with some of the core aesthetic 
strategies of the graphic and visual arts. Each student becomes a culture designer, looking 
at objects, bodies, movements, and public spaces as if they were artistic tools that could 
express their unique vision. In this sense, the activity is a way to make social data 
personally meaningful: to a certain extent, social life is comprised of personal visions. 
However, it also helps students do more than passively receive the institutional spaces 
and material practices that surround them. In other words, the scavenger hunt also helps 
them see that their private feelings about beauty and art are not entirely their own. 
(Notice that the first task on the list is to "find" a cliche, which is meant to demonstrate 
that, perhaps, much of what we experience aesthetically pleasing is actually experienced 
by many others.) To a certain extent, then, our private visions are socially constructed. 
After they have collected, edited, and organized their photographs, they begin the 
essay portion of the assignment. The writing consists of two parts, Parts 3 and 4. In Part 
3, they write a brief paragraph for each of the nine images, summarizing their 
photographic work as well as answering self-evaluative questions: Did you run into 
technical or conceptual issues that had to be resolved? Which photographer or classroom 
discussion shaped your project? If you'd had more time to flesh out this project, what 
would you have done differently? I let them know this is a low stakes task graded on a 
pass/fail basis, and ask them to keep the writing informal, in the style of journal entries. 
In Part 4 of the project, they write a reflective essay dealing with the visual and 
social culture of the university. It is here that I challenge them to thread together our 
conversations about photographic aesthetics, the material practices of the university, and 
their personal reflections on visual beauty and life at college. 
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Sample Assignment #2 
Making Narrative for Essay #1: Your Visual Discovery of the University, in Words 
Essay prompt 
You've looked at many interesting photographs from the last century and have applied the 
techniques you found there to your own images. Now, use the pictures you've taken as the backbone for an 
essay about your first semester at college. Some questions to get you started: How have you changed since 
arriving here, as an intellectual and as a citizen of this new community? Is this life anything like you 
expected it to be? In what ways? If not, how is it different? What experiences have you had that allow you 
to re-see who you were when you first arrived? 
The tone of this essay can be personal and reflective, meaning you are welcome to use the "I" 
voice, personal anecdotes, and a collage/montage format. I also want you to be analytical here: perform a 
close reading of at least one of the photographs you include in the essay, using the critical terms and 
strategies we've practiced in class. 
Also, think about how the images will be positioned relative to the writing. Will you frontload 
them, like Walker Evans's does in Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, or will you put them all at the end, as 
John Berger and Jean Mohr do in Another Way of Telling! Will you spread them out evenly, as Lawrence 
Sutin does in A Postcard Memoir! Or, will you intersperse them randomly like Paul Auster in The 
Invention of Solitude! Also, will you caption them or refer to them in the body of the essay? These creative 
decisions are just as important to the meaning of the essay as the written narrative itself. 
Note: Of the 9 final images you picked, choose 5 to 7 to be included in the essay. Choose images 
that display your unique visual style. They will be woven into the written portion of the essay, and the final 
draft will be posted to your wordpress.org blog. Your peers and I will comment on them there. 
Figure 2. Sample Assignment #2 
The most poignant and culturally relevant essays I have read as a teacher of 
college Composition have been those in which students make use of the ambiguous 
nature of the photograph—its dual role as aesthetic object and factual document, its 
capacity to haunt and be haunted by written narrative. Every photographic image can 
become an object of critical analysis—magazine advertisements, family photos, yearbook 
photos, mug shots, anonymous or "found" images, self-portraits, a shot captured two 
minutes ago on one's cell phone—as well as an object of aesthetic reflection, uncannily 
shining the past into the present. It is this infidelity of a photograph's semiosis, its 
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inherent capacity to make present the body of the past, which suits the medium so well to 
teaching writing in the age of "the pictorial turn," to use W. J. T. Mitchell's phrase (11). 
The best essays that come out of the four-part project I've just described make full use of 
the photograph, merging subjective experience with sophisticated visual practices. For 
these writers the personal and the public, the pleasurable and the critical, are stitched 
together into a holistic process. There is no reason not to free photography from its 
strangely unremarkable slot in Visual Studies and to recognize, once again, its unique 
value for college writing instruction. 
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CHAPTER II 
"VISIBLE THINGS" AND BEYOND: PHOTOGRAPHY, VOICE, AND THE 
PERSONAL NARRATIVE 
[Are] we so certain that autobiography depends on reference, as a 
photograph depends on its subject? 
—Paul de Man, "Autobiography as De-facement" (920 ) 
Autobiographical texts and photographs likewise indicate both an absence (of 
the body) and a presence (of life); they announce life in the midst of death as 
much as they anticipate death in the midst of life. 
—Linda Haverty Rugg, Picturing Ourselves (27) 
Each photo I look at in each album tells a different story than does my 
memory.... For me this is the mystery of the photograph. 
—"Silent Photographs" 
The idea that the personal experiences of students should inform writing 
instruction is old news. Near the end of nineteenth century, fueled by the ideological 
climate that gave rise to John Dewey's progressivism, college Compositionists, as 
Gertrude Buck observed in 1901, tended to "derive subjects for writing from the student's 
own experience, rather than from sources foreign to his knowledge or interest" (quoted in 
Brereton 241). Even as early as 1875, as Bob Connors writes in his history of the 
personal writing assignment, the "feelings, experiences, thoughts, and appreciations of 
the writer [came] to have a centrality and power in rhetorical education" (170). Holistic, 
experience-based pedagogies were edging out the more formal, formulaic, recitation-
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based pedagogies that had once dominated college education (Kitzhaber 61). As Connors 
puts it, the "classical approach" to education shifted toward "a rhetorical praxis far more 
personal, private, intimate" (169). This aspect of our pedagogical ancestry is also Don 
Bialostosky's subject when, reviewing the famous debate between Peter Elbow and 
David Bartholomae, he detects an echo of the "two-hundred-year debate opened by 
romanticism" regarding the difference between poetic (expressive) and scientific 
(socially constructed) knowledge ("Romantic Resonances" 93). Nathan Crick's review of 
the Elbow/Bartholomae debate reaches even further back, using Dewey's Art as 
Experience to argue that "the first interpretation of the Genesis myth" was actually the 
first time creativity was cast into doubt, since interpreters were uncertain if God created 
the world out of nothing (from within), or out of the raw, "universal discourse of the 
Word" (from without) ("Composition as Experience" 255). 
This chapter is more concerned with sketching out a theory than a history, but we 
can at least pause here and observe that when "Romantic" is used in Composition 
literature, it often refers to the pioneers of the Process Movement, and it is generally not a 
term of praise (e.g., Berlin's Writing Instruction in Nineteenth-Century American 
Colleges). In her CCCC Chair's address of 1989, Andrea Lunsford summed up the term's 
negative connotations: 
We need to realize the extent to which writing was necessary for the 
invention of the self, usually dated during the 12th century, the reification of 
that self in the Romantic 'author,' and its crossing to America as rugged 
individualism, self-reliance, and intellectual property, constructs which, as 
we know, have vested power in some groups while withholding power from 
others. ("Composing Ourselves" 73) 
This capsule history insists that Romanticism, reliant on a conception of self passed down 
from the Middle Ages, became an oppressive force in American culture and 
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expressivistic pedagogy. It implies that the concept of "voice"—long the most popular 
term of expressivist pedagogy, a metonym for the self and its authorial "presence"—is 
insufficient for explaining how meaning gets made in writing, and that it might even 
contribute to unethical cultural behaviors and habits of mind. Ostensibly, the notion of 
"voice," as it has been used by the likes of Walker Gibson and Ken Macrorie is a 
hegemonic assertion of bourgeois power, all the more insidious because of its apparent 
avoidance of political discourse. Darsie Bowden, in The Mythology of Voice, tries to bury 
the concept for good with her contention that poststructuralism has made "voice a kind of 
dinosaur" (60). 
In any case, Romanticism, it would seem, is conspicuously tied to Composition's 
origins, through the figure of voice and its production of an authorial "self." Such a 
criticism of voice feels a bit overstated, and this chapter evaluates its effectiveness in 
meeting the aesthetic and social demands of Composition today. To do this, I examine 
how the notion of voice, as an embodiment of the reification of self, interacts with 
photography. In this way, we can formulate questions that problematize an oversimplified 
dualism between "expressive" and "social" conceptions of personal writing: How does 
the notion of a self, and of a clear authorial voice, relate to the visual? How does a 
photograph inflect one's voice and one's representation of personal experience? In the 
familiar poststructural critique of subjectivity, which is often presented as a critique of 
voice, what is the photograph's role? Whereas Chapter I suggested that in descriptive 
writing, the image precedes the word (e.g., in the pedagogy of Tom Romano), this 
chapter investigates how photography develops a narrative voice. 
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Toward a Definition of Personal Narrative 
In this chapter, I am examining the relation between photography and personal 
writing assignments in Composition. Let's try another tentative definition of personal 
writing. Note first the filial relation of students' personal writing to canonical 
autobiography, which Philippe Lejeune defines, tongue firmly in postmodern cheek 
(121), as "retrospective prose narrative written by a real person concerning his own 
existence, where the focus is his individual life, in particular the story of his personality" 
(4). And according to Anne Ruggles Gere, more or less all "personal writing," whether 
called "personal narrative, personal experience essay," or "autobiographical writing," is 
"prose that gives significant attention to the writer's experiences and feelings" (204). We 
might also refer to it as a budding form of "creative nonfiction," which conveys the 
genre's emphasis on style and craft. It might also be considered memoir writing. (The 
OED does not confirm him on this point, but Gore Vidal nonetheless asserts that "A 
memoir is how one remembers one's own life, while an autobiography is history, 
requiring research, dates, facts double-checked," 5.) These terms can be more finely 
distinguished. For instance, a "personal essay" can be construed as a literary essay a la 
Montaigne or E. B. White, and an autobiography is often assumed to be a book-length 
publication. Nevertheless, for the sake of simplicity, I will use the four words, personal, 
autobiographical, interchangeably, as I think Gere does, as well as the words essay and 
narrative. The more important observation is that both Gere's and Lejeune's definitions 
imply a transcription of experience into language and of language into meaning, a 
complicated assumption we will address below. 
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Also, these definitions do not account for the materiality of autobiography, which 
becomes a complicated matter whenever words, photographs and other non-linguistic 
modes are combined within the autobiographical space. For many undergraduate students 
today, it is a space that is increasingly non-academic. My definition of personal narrative, 
then, also takes into consideration the visual and multimodal practices in which students 
are often heavily immersed outside of the classroom. Note the omnipresence of a few of 
the more popular social networking sites online, such as Bebo, BlackPlanet, Facebook, 
and Myspace. These sites allow for, encourage, and often require at least rudimentary 
manipulations of visual design, music, and networking software. Users weave verbal, 
filmic, and phonic texts into jocular, intimate, sentimental, eroticized, erudite, brooding, 
or menacing self-portraits. One's homepage can be designed as a dating resume, an 
advertisement for one's band, a place to air one's quasi-philosophical musings and 
political rants, or a graffiti wall—in other words, it is a self-portrait crafted according to 
new developments in software, a relatively new social context, and by the angle of a 
personal style. While not the kind of personal writing expected or required in many 
Composition courses, these technologically mediated, hyper-social spaces produce acts of 
self-referentiality unprecedented on this scale, and that are only recently becoming 
objects of extensive literacy research. As Kathleen Blake Yancey wrote in 2004: "Never 
before has the proliferation of writings outside the academy so counterpointed the 
Compositions inside" ("Made Not Only in Words" 298). 
Of course, this defines material and social conditions that can easily pertain to any 
mode and genre of student writing. I emphasize them here in order to highlight the 
indirect and covert ways a personal essay accrues meaning from sources other than the 
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personal. Which is to say, a personal narrative narrates more than just the story of the 
writer's personality. In this way my attempt at a definition of personal narrative enters the 
disagreement—famously articulated between Elbow and Bartholomae, but also 
manifesting itself throughout the history of Composition and across various areas of 
interest (see Berlin 1984, Tobin 1994, Matsuda 2003, and Fulkerson 2005)—over 
whether or not "the personal" is a productive or ethical component of Composition 
pedagogy. This chapter is a defense of personal writing assignments, in fact, but also a 
way to take seriously the important criticisms that have been leveled by poststructural 
critique against the reification of white, male, phallogocentric forms of discourse. Such a 
critique has been inflected differently by different scholars—compare the Althusserian 
rhetoric of Joel Foreman and David Shumway (chapter one) to the pragmatic, 
psychoanalytic rhetoric of Dominick LaCapra (chapter four), for example—to the point 
that "poststructuralism" is an extremely unreliable term, itself requiring more definitional 
work than I have space for here. To provide some necessary limits to my argument, then, 
I will rely on a single concept, "voice," to identify and corral a range of disagreements 
that are relevant to the issue of personal writing. Once the discussion has been framed in 
this way, we will be able to see more clearly how photography complicates and broadens, 
but also strengthens, the role of personal writing in Composition. 
Voice. Vision, and the Humility of Style 
If a way of seeing is also a way of not seeing, as Kenneth Burke and others have 
speculated, then a kind of blindness accompanies even the best critical analyses. Looking 
closely seems to require keeping one eye shut. This is a feature of discourse-making in 
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Composition theory, no less than in any other discursive field. To state the evident, we 
are blindest toward perspectives that do not fit with our views. "The uncritical distortions 
that strike me most are usually committed by my enemies," Wayne Booth writes 
("Pluralism and it Rivals" 786). The history of debate over using personal experience in 
Composition attests to this. This debate, which once ranged over a wider field of 
discourse (consider Harold Brent's response to Brent Harold in College English in 1972, 
or Gerald Graffs to John Rouse in the same publication in 1980, both "unconventional" 
by today's standards), seems to have crystallized into sets of mutually exclusive 
opposites, such as Personal/Academic, Expressivist/Social Constructivist, 
Aesthetics/Politics. (Brent Harold called for a Marxist pedagogy of expressive writing— 
who today can see his logic?) From a poststructural perspective, we can say this ordering 
of discourse into binary oppositions tends to privilege one term over the other, for 
political ends. Consequently, our field's argumentative history has contained quite a bit 
of "normal science" but not nearly as much innovation (let alone a "paradigm shift"), 
since these restrictive dualisms tend to channel discourse into well-worn grooves. 
Poststructuralism teaches us that these binaries, which are the basis for political power 
and hegemony, are anything but God-given, stable, or unassailable. With the right kind of 
rhetorical pressure we can pry open the fissure between the two terms in each pair, ignite 
their difference, disrupt the political power they hold in place, and make room for new 
knowledge. 
We can use the supposedly dead concept of voice as a crowbar with which to pry 
open the issue of the personal.. The concept of voice, though it has its roots in narrative 
theory and nineteenth-century literature, first became prominent in Composition through 
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those teachers Darsie Bowden refers to as the "voicists" (59), such as Ken Macrorie and 
Walker Gibson. I will focus on these two teachers, since their different approaches to the 
concept of voice sketch out how the use of voice can situate a self in writing—but also 
because they have been frequent straw men for the typical poststructuralist critique of 
expressivism. In looking closely at their pedagogical views, I will argue, we have the raw 
material for an "expressive" pedagogy that contributes to rather than falls victim to the 
prevailing critique of subjectivity. 
In "The Voice of the Writer," written in 1962, Walker Gibson situates voice as a 
fairly straightforward rhetorical tool. Compositionists generally use the term, he writes, to 
help a student "into an area of experience ... in which he is making linguistic distinctions 
he wasn't making before." For example, if in the middle of an argumentative essay a 
student suddenly modifies her syntax and downshifts from a formal to a colloquial tone 
of voice, the teacher can bring this to the student's attention and thus encourage a 
linguistic "self-consciousness" in her, since "the self becomes defined by the language 
that the student is using"; "and this," Gibson writes, "is the only self we are interested in" 
(11). The teacher's job is not necessarily to discourage shifts in tone, but to point them 
out to the student so that she can learn to determine whether or not they are rhetorically 
effective. Gibson's pragmatic interest is in "the limit imposed on the writer by his choice 
of voice, the particular man, image, personality, or artificial tone that he chooses to 
present himself with" (12). 
For Gibson, voice is a rhetorical act (an "artificial tone") that allows a writer to 
stage a particular narrative persona. This persona or ethos is an illusion, a sophisticated 
"performance" of style, as Tom Newkirk put it (1997), which is required of writers who 
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wish to engage the complexity of experience without having to pretend to "know it all." 
Gibson defines the stylist as a writer "who is aware of the limits of his knowledge" and 
who holds onto "a sense of this irrevocable difficulty about words and things, the 
impossibility ... of expressing experience as experience really is." Most importantly for 
Gibson, then, attending to the rhetorical possibilities of one's written voice helps make 
humility the cornerstone of style. In this quote from Richard Oppenheimer, Gibson 
communicates that the motif of humility-as-style is relevant to all fields of inquiry, from 
politics to science to "the most trivial of personal affairs": 
It is style which, in the domain of foreign policy, enables us to find a 
harmony between the pursuit of ends essential to us and the regard to the 
views, the sensibilities, the aspirations of those to whom the problem may 
appear in another light. It is style which is the deference that action pays to 
uncertainty. (13) 
Walker Gibson has been roundly criticized for being an expressivist (Faigley, ""Material 
Literacy and Visual Design"; Bowden; George, "From Analysis to Design"). Yet here 
we see him decentering a unified subjectivity in writing, grappling with the role of 
language in constructing a self, distinguishing between kinds of selves that may be called 
into being by different (political, scientific, personal) discourses. Insomuch as Gibson's 
style is a "deference," a reverential gesture, it is also a rhetorical pause or hyphen: a 
generative narrative silence which both acknowledges and gains sustenance from the 
irreconcilable gap between experience, language, and meaning. 
Walker Gibson was not the only pioneering "voicist" who positioned prose style 
as more than a merely personal effect. In Telling Writing, Ken Macrorie famously 
borrowed from a student text the neologism "Engfish" to describe "the phony, pretentious 
language of the schools," what Henry Thoreau called "torpid words, wooden or lifeless 
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words" (Macrorie 1 ), and what has also been called "academese." "Man's maturity," 
Macrorie communicates through Nietzsche, is "to have regained the seriousness that he 
had as a child at play" (3). In "From Anonymous, Evasive Prose to Writing with 
Passion," Scott Russell Sanders echoes this obligation to a natural language. As "a 
schoolboy," Sanders writes, "I loved language with the juice still in it and the bark still on 
it, language that conveyed the rhythm and reach of an individual voice," but a life in the 
school system and the process of writing a dissertation made him "adept at the passive 
voice, that essential tool of bureaucrats, corporate pirates, and flimflam artists" (B4). It 
was only after he was far enough along in the tenure process that he was able to return to 
his childhood passion for concrete prose: "I drew shamelessly on my own life. I swore off 
jargon and muddle and murk. I wrote in the active voice, and as nearly as I could in my 
own voice, the one I used in speaking about matters close to my heart" (B5). This use of 
voice reveals a faith in the capacity of language to refer directly to experience (not to 
mention the "heart"). It is also an explicitly political act of resistance against the highly 
specialized, dehumanizing language of bureaucracy and corporatized efficiency. 
We see from this the extent to which Macrorie's use of voice is linked to 
American transcendentalism and a romantic conception of the creative individual. He 
quotes Ralph Waldo Emerson: "But wise men pierce this rotten diction and fasten words 
again to visible things" (2). There exists, in other words, a natural world of visible things 
to which language can fasten, which is a metaphysical concept much critical theory 
attacks at its foundations. Jacques Derrida's celebrated critique of the "metaphysics of 
presence," for example, positions "voice" as a foundational problem in Western thought: 
In every case [in the history of the West], voice is closest to the signified.... 
All signifiers, and first and foremost the written signifier, are derivative with 
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regard to what would wed the voice indissolubly to the mind or to the thought 
of the signified sense.... The written signifier is always technical and 
representative. (11) 
In Derridean thought, "phonocentrism" is the bias toward "the voice and to breath," 
which is "very close to the interior holy voice" that derives true knowledge from the 
Word of God, and that situates the human voice in a close proximal relation to the divine 
(17). Writing, on the other hand, is the lesser term in the speech/writing dichotomy, 
historically understood as merely "technical," a human invention that can only mediate 
the Word of God; it is a second degree "fall into exteriority of meaning" (13), a use of 
language that has been "exiled in the exteriority of the body" (17). Writing's meaning is 
mediated, in that it is exterior to logos or "presence," whereas speech gives the illusion of 
being "closest to the self," an illusion that has, since Plato, valorized speech and 
disparaged writing (20). From this view of speech as "inside" (in a close proximity to 
truth) and writing as "outside" (a "mediation of a mediation" of truth) we can see that 
Macrorie's use of voice takes a phonocentric stance: "Before you write your next paper, 
sit still a moment and listen to yourself speaking inside. If you hear a voice that takes on 
a clear tone, ... listen as you write and get it on paper" (151)—that is, take the inner truth 
and write it out. 
Darsie Bowden contends that under the weight of this Derridean attack on 
authorial presence, the metaphor of voice "ceases to function effectively" (61) and can 
only "fail at being unitary, coherent, and consistent because within one's voice are 
always the refractions of the voices of others, themselves heteroglossic" (72). I don't 
mean to set Bowden up as a straw figure here; she sustains an illuminating discussion of 
voice and adroitly proposes that "all metaphors foreclose on other ways of perceiving 
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experience" (61). But I think she gives too little attention to the ways a pedagogy of voice 
contains within itself the seeds for a complicated understanding of subjectivity. I don't 
plan to defend an apolitical, solipsistic program of hegemonic indoctrination, as some 
critics have defined expressivism. Then again, I don't think this is what expressivism has 
been, even when it has relied on voice to explain the production of meaning in writing. 
As noted by Walker Gibson, "voice" has the pragmatic effect of helping inexperienced 
writers incorporate humility into their sense of style, which I read as helping them grasp 
the Active nature of all representation. Rather than allow students to be paralyzed by the 
de-centered and dispersed nature of language, Gibson asks them to work with what they 
have, which is not a single voice but an awareness of the distance between experience 
and language. Meaning, for Gibson, rises up out of this lack of a connection. Indeed, 
speaking of this lack or loss becomes for him a powerful pedagogical tool, one he will 
build on throughout his writings on voice and in his textbooks dealing with visual culture 
( and ). 
It would seem Macrorie's use of voice is much harder to bring into line with a 
poststructural awareness of the linguistic predicament. But I think it would be unwise to 
summarily dismiss what he offers writing teachers. Phonocentric bias notwithstanding, 
what does his pedagogy teach? As noted above, Macrorie's use of Thoreau and Emerson 
reveals a link with Romanticism's embrace of individual tuition over doctrinal thinking, 
its love of nature as the mirror of man, and even its aspirations for a new voice to "sing 
America." If there is any doubt about this link, consider the following passage from 
Emerson's famous "American Scholar" speech: 
[The American Scholar should see] that nature is the opposite of the soul, 
answering to it part for part. One is seal, and one is print. Its beauty is the 
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beauty of his own mind. Its laws are the laws of his own mind. Nature then 
becomes to him the measure of his attainments. So much of nature as he is 
ignorant of, so much of his own mind does he not yet possess. And, in fine, 
the ancient precept, "Know thyself," and the modern precept, "Study nature," 
become at last one maxim. (Oration delivered to the Phi Beta Kappa Society 
at Cambridge, MA, August 31, 1837) 
Vision for Emerson is a complex epistemological and ontological operation: 
transcendental in its imagining of an American "nature," and yet rooted in the earthy 
realities of day to day American life. Looking outside of the self into nature, we find the 
contours of our innermost self, Emerson tells us. Likewise, introspection reveals 
processes of nature (namely, intuition and creativity) that make self-representation an act 
that reveals the self to be something more than self, to be more than one's own 
personality. I have not conveyed the complexity of Emerson's thought or the romantic 
tradition, which at any rate is not uniform in its understanding of the creative mind, as 
M. H. Abrams tells us {The Mirror and the Lamp 1953). But I think Macrorie uses 
Emerson's ideas to encourage a prose style that is "close to the bone," that brings the 
flesh of the world into writing. Important to note, however, he also suggests that in order 
to find "a true voice" (151), a writer must write "indirectly," using strategies such as 
irony, burlesque, or sarcasm to interrupt the expectation of "a straight line [of narrative 
meaning] that runs right" to the reader (228). 
I think this presents us with more than a mimetic relation of mind to nature. It also 
inserts a privative relation ("privative" denoting the absence of something that was 
supposed to be present) between the "eye" and the "I" of autobiography. The Socratic 
"know thyself," the command to look inward, is counterbalanced by the command to 
study nature, to look outward—which requires a certain degree of "losing sight" of one's 
self, of relinquishing the self temporarily. "It is as hard to see one's self as to look 
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backwards without turning around," Thoreau wrote. Close observation, even (or 
especially) when the observed object is the experiential self, requires that one eye stay 
shut. That is, the observing eye must see inside and outside simultaneously; must see 
"visible things" but also beyond the visible; must see the self when writing 
autobiography, for example, but also beyond the self (to observe its relation to nature). 
It is this double vision that is ignored in so many poststructural critiques of 
expressivist pedagogy and the concept of voice. Bowden's argument looks at one aspect 
in the history of expressivist rhetoric and its romantic legacy—the desire for authorial 
presence in the written text—but it doesn't see that voice also serves as an encounter with 
absence. Used in this way, absence is a theoretical term borrowed from poststructural 
discourse, but it resonates with Gibson's notion of humility-as-style, and with Macrorie's 
sense of nature as the "visible thing" that is lost and that language tries to recover. It is 
this double vision, moreover, that makes "life writing" and "light writing," as Timothy 
Dow Adams calls autobiography and photography, two modes of representation for 
which the concept of authorial presence takes on new life. In the following section, I will 
connect the themes raised so far with photography and autobiography, in order to argue 
that the case against the personal essay—that it is a politically inert genre reliant on a 
suspect illusion of authorial presence—needs to be reopened, since photography today is 
such an omnipresent feature of our students' public and private lives. 
The Double Vision of Photography and Autobiography 
Since the 1970s, there has been a sustained debate over the scope, definition, and 
referential status of autobiography. Poststructuralism in particular has led scholars to 
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proclaim the demise of autobiography as a literary form, as Michael Sprinker does in 
"Fictions of the Self: The End of Autobiography." This attempt to undermine the 
authority of autobiography is grounded in a more fundamental critique of the self, which 
itself has three sources: (1) perhaps most notably, Jacques Lacan's contention that 
subjective consciousness exists not in isolation, but only in a specular (mirroring) relation 
with the Other (4); (2) Roland Barthes' thesis in "The Death of the Author" that an 
author's identity is "a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centers of culture" 
(146); and Foucault's thesis that the familiar concept of an "author" is a relatively recent 
invention; in actuality the "author" is not a single, identifiable subject at all, but rather a 
"function" of a complex web of discursive practices ("What is an Author" 1969). 
Probably the most rigorous critique of the autobiographical self, however, is the 
one offered by Paul de Man. In "Autobiography as De-facement," de Man demonstrates 
that defining autobiography by its generic status or by a "pact" between the writer and the 
reader proves problematic (see Lejeune), and distinguishing it from fiction even becomes 
an impossibility, since all language is figural, making autobiography "not a genre or a 
mode, but a figure of reading or of the understanding that occurs, to some degree, in all 
texts" (921). An autobiographical narrative thus does not refer to the author herself but 
rather to "the illusion of reference," to a literary figure (the narrator) that is not "clearly 
and simply a referent at all but something more akin to a fiction" (920). In life writing, de 
Man would say, the text does not refer to the author, but rather to the violent action of 
language on his or her experience—that is, to the "figuration" of him- or herself through 
the rhetorical figure of prosopopoeia (926).x The narrative voice, in other words, marks 
not the actual author but the author's absenting him- or herself through language. This 
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argument deconstructs the special referential power of autobiography, but its more far-
reaching implication is the erasure of the writing subject's body. This brand of 
poststructuralism finds, beneath an autobiographical style, not the tone and timbre of an 
actual writer's voice, but a corpse. 
Yet, in spite of the cadaverous sense of loss that shadows the autobiographical 
subject, in spite of the rigorous poststructural critique of authorial presence, the 
photographic image retains, in Andre Bazin's phrase, the "irrational power ... to bear 
away our faith" (241). We can find this naive embrace of photography, ironically, in the 
very scholars who most ardently proclaim the death of the author. Such poststructuralists 
as de Man and Barthes, despite their skepticism about the power of language, "become 
remarkably gullible when it comes to photographs" (Rugg 11). When de Man asks, "Are 
we so certain that autobiography depends on reference, as a photograph depends on its 
subject?" he explicitly attacks a naive belief in autobiographical referentiality, but 
simultaneously accepts that a photograph is literally an emanation of the referent. To see 
somebody in a photograph, de Man implies, makes him or her present in a way that is 
impossible in writing. "One is seal, and one is print," Emerson might add. Likewise, 
Barthes insists that photography's punctum seems to verify the naive belief that a 
photograph can "touch" the world: "From a real body, which was there, proceed 
radiations which ultimately touch me, who am here" (80). Though it has been well 
established in scholarship (and perhaps in common understanding) that photographs are 
culturally constructed, prone to manipulation and falsification, (Snyder and Allen ; 
Berger; Walton ; Trachtenberg, Reading American Photographs), the medium retains 
nonetheless a force of persuasion that borders on the magical. In fact, completely verbal 
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autobiography derives power from the camera's irrational, magical illusion of 
referentiality. 
Consider Camera Lucida, where Barthes' "turn toward referentiality" becomes a 
kind of "deathbed conversion" that serves as an affirmation of "life and being in the face 
of death and the body's dissolution" (Rugg 14). In this text, Barthes finds the visual 
equivalent of what writing teachers have called "authentic voice." He contends that the 
portrait photographer must snap the shutter at just the right moment in order to capture 
the essence, the "soul" (109), the "luminous shadow which accompanies the body" of the 
photographed subject. If this essential quality is missed—if the photographer cannot 
capture the small but poignant details which bring the subject to life—then the resulting 
image contains "no more than a sterile body" (110). Ken Macrorie could not have said it 
better. What must be captured are those "visible things" that comprise the full, textural 
space of the world—all the details that fill the visual world's "analogical plenitude," all 
the fleeting and usually unnoticed things that comprise the "optical unconscious." It isn't 
a leap of logic to hear in this language the romantic compulsion to voice. 
Barthes also offers us a model for reading personal narrative, a way not entirely 
inconsistent with the sense of language found in Gibson and Macrorie. Reading his text 
and gazing at its images, we begin to encounter Barthes himself, but only on the sly, 
tangentially. (In my edition, the sole photo of the author is a clear, well-lit head shot on 
the back cover—but he looks down and away from the lens, is reserved, maintains an 
expression of quiet attention, as if reading a text somewhere beyond the frame—Barthes' 
"luminous shadow" speaks to me from this photograph). He teaches us throughout how to 
read his text (how to findhivci). For example, he contends that the difference between a 
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pornographic and an erotic photograph is that the former tries to reveal everything, 
whereas the latter conceals that which is most intimate (interiority); the erotic photograph 
"takes the spectator outside its frame, and it is there that I animate this photograph and it 
animates me" (59). By framing the photographic subject tenuously, tentatively—with 
humility, aware of the limitations of representation; that is, with a sense of style—and 
asking the viewer to imagine a "beyond" while gazing directly at the image, Barthes 
offers a model for looking at photographs that is also a way to read life narratives. In this 
erotics of photographic interpretation, the image operates by revealing but also by veiling 
the subject. Indeed, the first image of Barthes' text is of an empty bed: vacated just a 
moment ago, shrouded in dark curtains, but permeated by a soft, crepuscular light that 
seeps in through a small opening (an aperture) in the curtains, the bed seems to invite a 
body. (Who is presently absent from this erotic space? The viewer.) Personal narrative, 
with its processes of figuration and its reference to a "beyond," operates within a parallel 
economy of revelation and concealment. As Adams writes, "Autobiography's most 
salient feature" is its "attempt at reconciling authors' sense of self with their lives through 
an art that simultaneously reveals and conceals," and this, he observes, "is at the heart of 
the photographic act as well" {Light Writing & Life Writing 21). 
What should be apparent at this point is that the poststructuralist critique of 
authorial presence in Composition, as manifested by the frequent dismissal of voice and 
disdain for expressive rhetoric, tends toward two significant blindnesses. On the one 
hand, it hastily dismisses expressive rhetoric for putting forward a narrow conception of 
subjectivity; on the other, it presumes that poststructuralism is immune to the irrational 
desire for "pure" reference. Neither of these claims accounts for the turns of thought 
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addressed in this chapter. Teachers such as Gibson and Macrorie draw on a rich 
intellectual tradition that not only acknowledges but also embraces the ambiguity and 
uncertainty entailed with presenting a self in writing. And some of the most prominent 
poststructural theorists of the last few decades have been shown to make room for, 
through the figure of the photograph, at least a partial, temporary but recurring 
("haunted") authorial presence. Darsie Bowden's argument relies on a Derridean critique 
of presence, but Bowden does not acknowledge that even Derrida admits moments of 
"gullibility." (Note for example his observation that the "most cultivated, the most 
reasonable, the most nonbelieving people easily reconcile a certain spiritualism with 
reason," 88-89.) All of this asks us to acknowledge not only that the expressivists indeed 
have a relation to contingent subjectivity and linguistic lack, as noted above, but that 
poststructuralists tend to have more of a bond to presence than is often admitted. 
Photography Visible, Obscured, and Invisible 
Last year I printed a commemorative series of portraits of a poet friend ... 
who died 11 years ago. In each of my images he was large and vigorous; in 
one or two I could literally hear his voice. 
—Elsa Dorftnan, portrait photographer 
We don't require a highly specialized discourse to see that photography has deep 
connections to personal experience and life writing. Most academics, at least, have likely 
been haunted by particular photographs, have sensed their narrative intensity, even if they 
have not written about them. Through years of exposure to texts with photos, we also 
have a good hunch how photographs can mix with words. I am speaking of the nuts and 
bolts of a photo essay: choosing images which meet our narrative goals, actually putting 
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photographs on paper, and determining how each page will look in the completed draft. 
The rest of this chapter presents three strategies for combining words and images (all 
based on Sample Assignment #3). These practices are all informed by the specific 
properties of actual photographs (even absent ones), and they all ask students to conceive 
of narrative voice as a visual as well as a textual phenomenon. 
Sample Assignment #3 
Picture Perfect: Photography and the (Perfect?) Family Narrative 
[Teacher's note: Early on, I ask students to collect old family photographs. The oldest pictures 
are the most intriguing, I tell them, and I encourage them to search out photos from the time before they 
were born. Not all students have access to childhood or family images. If they don't, I direct them to write 
the kind of essay discussed at the end of this chapter.] 
Write an essay that incorporates the family photographs you've been collecting. 
First, choose 3 of the best images and write about each of them in your class journal. 
(1) What about the structure of the image makes it stand out? Describe the physical details of the 
image without interpreting what they might mean: that is, be as objective as possible. Is the image in color 
or black-and-white? How many subjects are in the photo, and how can you objectively describe their 
manner of dress, posture, bodily and facial expressions? Is a certain detail you're intrigued by near the left 
or right, the top or bottom, or in the foreground or background of the image? Try to attend to every detail 
you can in this image. 
(2) What about the social context of the image makes it important? Provide any contextual 
information you know or have gained from this image: that is, give us its subjective backdrop. If the scene 
is unremarkable, explain what the viewer should be seeing when they look at this image. 
(3) After describing these photographs objectively and subjectively, write about your family. 
What other stories do these images bring to mind? How have the people and places we see there changed, 
and why have they changed? 
(4) Finally, write about how this process of finding, ordering, and looking at these images has 
affected the narrator. 
Second, determine how the words and images will be visually placed on the page. Experiment 
with different spatial configurations. How do they look at the head of the essay, at the end, or evenly 
dispersed throughout? Will you caption them? (If so, will your captions be clips from the essay itself or 
will they be new text?) Or, will they be mentioned in the body of the essay? You can also include the 
images without referring to them directly. (This will require you to find photographs that illuminate your 
family narrative well.) If you choose not to refer to the images, how will you place them in such a way that 
they make narrative sense? How might your narrative address these images, without having to explain 
them? 
Figure 3. Sample Assignment #3 
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WYSIWYG, or Photography Visible: What You See Is What You Get 
The most common style of photo essay, and the first I introduce to students, is that found 
in magazines like Newsweek, RoSampleling Stone, and Time—captioned or directly 
referenced by the text, linked by a "straight line" of meaning. (In geek vernacular, the 
acronym WYSIWIG denotes pure mimesis: what you see on your computer screen is 
exactly what will come out of the printer.) In terms of practicality, this first assignment 
allows us to begin talking about visual design skills that are applicable to any visual-
verbal text. We attend to borders and framing, the structure of specific photographs (e.g., 
lighting, composition, angle of view, color vs. black-and-white), how to manage spacing 
on each page, font style, cropping and/or enlarging of images, as well as the order in 
which they will be presented throughout the text. 
Also, this assignment helps us problematize the idea of a direct channel of 
meaning between the subject of the photograph and the subject in writing. It helps 
students see the photos, captions, and stories of a photo essay as fictions created by a 
canny authorial eye and careful editorial work. In fact, this stylistic approach to the photo 
essay reveals how deceptive, how "hollow and lifeless," how mute the "wrong" personal 
photograph can be. (I once heard one student ask another, while looking at an image of 
herself, "Do I look this boring in real life?") Whereas students begin with the hope that a 
certain image will speak their inner truth, this assignment often requires that they revise 
their expectations and approach the process again with some strategic humility. Finding 
the "luminous shadow" of the subject in both writing and photography requires a nuanced 
narrative voice. 
Unsurprisingly, first drafts of such a project are rarely successful, if the measure 
of success is capturing the "essence" of a narrative subject. Though it can be a powerful 
learning experience to realize that magazine photographs are carefully managed and 
manipulated, students are occasionally disappointed with the images they bring in and 
with how they actually look on the page. This is to be expected for writers who are not 
accustomed to having to craft or perform a visual or written self. What's more, students 
may not have interesting (or any) photographs of themselves or family members. Asking 
them to produce their own pictures may or may not be an option. The photographs they 
do have may be completely lackluster—the supply of virtually indistinguishable high 
school graduation snapshots is seemingly endless. But if students approach the creative 
task with a sense of humility, even the most dull, uninformative, emotionally blank 
images can be made meaningful in an unexpected way, can be put to narrative work, and 
can generate a strong sense of voice. 
As a case in point, I recently worked with a student ("Carl") who, though always 
excited to contribute to class conversations about writing, politics, and visual culture, was 
an uninventive writer and had produced a dry, formulaic first essay. In response to the 
"Picture Perfect" prompt, he had brought in a single photograph of himself, centered 
against a dark background, his right arm around his mother, his sister to her right. He is 
wearing a red cap and gown. To his left, further away and behind, stands his father. All 
four look directly into the camera, and by their closeness, relaxed postures and the 
warmth in their smiles, we can guess they are related. This first draft was based off an 
informal snapshot titled "Graduation," and essentially consisted of a two page description 
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of the meal Carl and his family enjoyed on the day he received his diploma. Sticking 
closely to the "WYSIWYG" approach, he also named each family member in his photo. 
Carl would eventually produce a powerful photo essay out of this incredibly 
mediocre first draft, but before I describe it I want to note the ways this assignment asks 
students to conceptualize photography as an aspect of their narrative voice. The link 
between visuality and vocality is an old topic, and practicing photographers know it well. 
"There comes a point in your photographic journey," writes photojournalist Stanley 
Leary, "where you begin to find your own voice." Others, like portraitist Elsa Dorfman in 
the quote above, hear a voice "literally" rising up from the image. "Voice" thus aims to 
describe an aspect of visual experience that can't be gotten at with a purely visual 
vocabulary. 
This is perhaps due to the phenomenological difference between hearing and 
seeing: whereas vision seems to penetrate and isolate, sound radiates and encompasses. In 
Walter Ong's words, the "visual ideal is clarity and distinctness, a taking apart," whereas 
the "auditory ideal... is harmony, a putting together" (Orality and Literacy 72). The 
"highest charm" of great works of art, Emerson writes, "is the Universal language they 
speak" (230). Such charm is more than "skill in surfaces, in outlines, or rules of art," but 
rather is "a radiation from the work of art of human character" (229). Beauty or "charm," 
as Emerson defines it, is more than the sum of its parts—what is charming about visual 
art is that it shows us more than what we can see (for Emerson, this surplus is 
"character"; for Barthes, it is "essential being"). What is beautiful or sublime about art, in 
this view, is that it addresses what is absent from the scene of representation. 
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Photographs can have a voice, then, insofar as they speak to us of their own absence-as-
presence. 
I forget who gave us this great phrase: "I can't define voice, but I know it when I 
see it." Seeing and hearing have always collaborated and wrestled on the page, and not 
just in the narrower sense of ekphrasis, as "giving voice to a mute art object" (Mitchell 
152). In the photo essay, voice also animates photographs. "Voice" is a chiasmus, a 
rhetorical figure lodged firmly between sound and vision. It helps us grasp the mysterious 
energy between words and photographs, without resolving the constant movement of one 
mode toward the other. Walker Gibson confirms this when he says that "seeing is at the 
very center of the writer's situation," but that the writer's vision is more than what is 
contained within a single image (46). If a writer's style is comprised of pauses and gaps 
just as much as from what is actually said (what Gibson calls "humility"), than 
photographs, in their pronounced silences, can strengthen one's voice. 
With the voices of these other writers and artists in mind, I return to the 
classroom. I think Carl's revision process powerfully epitomizes how photographs 
engage with and enlarge a writer's voice. Before he revised "Graduation," the class read 
the first half of Paul Auster's The Invention of Solitude. One of the images Auster weaves 
into this autobiography is a faded, seemingly straightforward portrait of his father's 
childhood family (4). It is the first image the reader encounters in the text, apparently 
nothing more than a sepia representation of a bucolic nineteenth-century family. After 
closely describing the background and placement of characters—itself a virtuoso 
performance and lesson in close reading—Auster gives an eloquent interpretation that is 
also an act of discovery. He realizes, to his horror and ours, that his "grandfather had 
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been cut out of it" by Auster's grandmother, who had in fact murdered the grandfather 
(35). Auster turns the photograph into a narrative device that works by interrupting the 
narrative—it becomes a pause, a hyphen. Rather than establishing a straight line of 
meaning to the reader, Auster lets the image divert our gaze, as well as our sense of how 
photography reifies an understanding of "family." Inevitably, the reader returns to the 
front of the book to examine the image again, and is haunted by it. Auster's voice, 
artfully woven between word and image, is a rich, multilayered performance of de-
centered subjectivity, but a masterful self-performance, nonetheless. 
After reading and discussing the Auster text, Carl decided to keep his graduation 
snapshot but changed the essay's title to "Ghost," focusing it on his own father and 
giving it a sense of purpose the first draft lacked. The essay keeps quite a bit of the 
gastronomic lavishness ("That was a great meal," Carl told me when I pointed this out), 
but now includes two paragraphs closely analyzing the snapshot, in which he observes 
that his father "is miles away from his family, yet he can be seen clearly through this 
photograph." The laughter and closeness of the rest of the family now casts into relief his 
father's severe shyness, a "ghost" who "is present and floats aimlessly from place to 
place," who appears in photographs "in the background, walking by himself," or is 
"partially photographed, [so the viewer can only see] his shoulder or leg" (4). After 
reading this, the original photograph becomes animated, resisting the dismissive vision 
usually reserved for such images. Carl also cropped a close-up of his father's kindly face 
and reprinted it at the top of the essay's final page, drawing our gaze further into the 
original photograph. In this way, "Ghost" dramatically stages the absenting of the 
narrative subject, Carl's father, but also keeps him in our gaze, and in a brilliant final 
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turn, asks us to return his. In presenting the reader with a photograph of a subject who by 
his nature shrinks away from the camera's probing eye, Carl allows this otherwise 
ordinary, uneventful snapshot to give voice to a man who would otherwise remain silent 
and invisible. 
Photography Obscured: What You See Is Not What You Get 
Another combining strategy is found in Lawrence Sutin's A Postcard Memoir, an 
autobiography divided into ninety-seven vignettes or "themes," each of which has 
reprinted above or alongside it an old black-and-white picture postcard. Though the book 
was written in the 1990s, apparently none of its postcard photographs are more recent 
than the 1930s or 40s (most are much older), and all are found art. This is a good text for 
short in-class readings. More importantly, it demonstrates that, unlike the more traditional 
mix of word and image described above, the autobiographical photograph doesn't have to 
derive from the same time or geographic space as the written narrative, or even from the 
actual life of the writer. (What the reader sees is not what he gets, as I aim to demonstrate 
in a moment.) This fictional image produces an effect of dislocation, of strangeness, but 
also of humor in the personal narrative. As an example of the humor photography offers 
in relation to personal narratives, in one vignette about being a boy and admiring 
(wrongly, it appears) his father's "freedom" as an adult, Sutin uses a postcard of what we 
assume are the members of a family—father, mother, daughter, and son—walking past a 
fish ladder. The father stares off into the distance as a single salmon goes airborne in the 
foreground. The postcards work metaphorically for the writing, but because they are 
images of real people who had likely passed away before the book was even published, 
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the metaphor is made strange, and this strangeness is imparted to Sutin's written 
narrative. The ghostly quality, the strangeness, with which the image unexpectedly 
makes the text speak, becomes a part of Sutin's "luminous shadow." 
This raises a good question for class discussion: "Does including fictional images 
in an autobiography make it less true, or at least less autobiographical?" This in turn leads 
us to question the troublesome distinction between truth and fiction, the value of personal 
experience in establishing a claim in writing, how photography can mediate our 
understanding of experience and the self, and whether or not we can ever call a 
photograph "fictional" (as opposed to falsified by actual manipulation). Sutin maintains 
that these images actually add to his personal narrative, insisting that "certain memories 
of mine began to seep into certain postcards," while other postcards "were egging me on 
through the stations of my life" (3). The images, fictional but absolutely realistic, drew 
the writer into an authentic engagement with autobiography. I think students quickly 
grasp this game, and enjoy searching for photographs—comical, mysterious, obscure— 
that they believe can help them portray qualities of their historical being that up to then 
might never have been thought. 
After reading Sutin, many students opt for this strategy. They are still required to 
make the images speak to the writing, that is, to make them purposeful for the narrative. 
But if things have gone well in the semester, they've learned better how to do this with 
subtlety and reservation—what Gibson calls style—using photography for rhetorical as 
well as illustrative purposes. 
My favorite example of this strategy deploys a single gray, foggy image, about 
one inch wide and two inches high, which is not mentioned anywhere else in the 
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student's ("Kat's") essay, though it is framed at the top of the first page. True, it is an 
image of Kat as a little girl, but it is left uncaptioned, unreferenced—it could be any little 
girl. The title of the essay, in bold and printed directly above the photo, is "Of My 
Asymmetrical Composition and the Sudden Conception of an Unexpected Cysta." The 
essay describes Kat's experience with inexplicably gaining weight at fifteen, being told 
by her doctor she was pregnant, then discovering that, in actuality, she carried in her 
stomach a twenty-pound teratoma, containing "one healthy liver, much hair, many teeth," 
and whom Kat named, with great affection, "Little Suzy" (5). 
This complicity of self with Other uncannily mirrors photography's role in 
autobiography. On the one hand, the photograph, because of its placement directly 
beneath Kat's remarkable title, does not portray Kat but rather Little Suzy, who gazes at 
the reader as a monstrous Other. This is the rhetorical work of prosopopoeia, de Man 
tells us, in which a figure in the text speaks as if from beyond the grave. On the other 
hand, as uncanny as the image becomes, the little figure is still and always Kat, whose 
actual body survived and bears the scar of the surgery. Through this photograph, in other 
words, the writer's self survives the cut of autobiography. Rugg observes that this is akin 
to a cinematic "trick." The cinema's moving images are in fact mute, but the separate 
technology of sound recording is sequenced in such a way as to veil this silence. Used 
simultaneously, the two technologies give the illusion of an embodied voice, of "real life" 
in two dimensions. In a similar manner, photography in this personal essay links Kat's 
"voice" with her "body," allowing us to see "that the inclusion of photographs envisions 
a revitalization of the corpse of the author, a re-membering of the autobiographical self 
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(21). Such an essay not only has an "authentic voice," in other words, but this voice rises 
up from a material body. 
Photography Invisible: What You See Isn't There 
Another effective strategy for combining writing and photography is to represent the 
photographs in writing only, allowing their absence to become narrative force. A 
powerful example of this is a student essay aptly titled "Silent Photographs." The writer 
begins by revealing that she has not seen her father since she was four, and that when he 
left "he stole all the photographs of me," which she finds inexplicable. She goes on to 
establish a sort of anti-photographic life-philosophy, simultaneously denying the validity 
of photographic truth and laying claim to it in order to narrate her personal history: 
Photographs play tricks on our memories. I look at photographs from when I 
was younger and in all the photographs I am smiling. I am smiling because 
someone is telling me to smile or because photographs are taken of my 
family at happy times. By looking at photographs from my family, one would 
get the notion that there isn't a sad day in the life of [our] family. I look at 
photos from eighth grade environmental camp. Each photo is a picture of my 
friends and I having fun. But I remember I hated eighth grade. I hated 
everything about eighth grade. There were too many cliques. There were too 
many arguments. There were too many rules. But pictures weren't taken of 
me strolling down the corridor to classes or sitting in the principal's office 
after getting in a fight on the bus. I don't have pictures of all my friends 
fighting over what eighth grade girls fight about. But maybe one day I will 
look through this photo album when I can't remember those details and think 
of how much I loved eighth grade, just look at that smile on my face. School 
days were so much fun. (2) 
Overall, the essay suggests that she is not so much angry at her father as she is angry at 
the photographs taken of her after her father left—as if he were a bumbling but otherwise 
benign accomplice to the crime, and the photographs themselves the true source of 
betrayal. In fact, when she finally meets her father (a few months before writing this 
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essay), she sees that photography will betray him, too: "He will look at pictures of 
himself and I, the daughter he hasn't seen for sixteen years, and he won't know that I at 
the very least respect him." What photographs actually betray, she reveals in her final 
sentence, is language itself: "They say that photographs speak a thousand words, but that 
does not replace the words that should have been spoken" (4). 
Rather than situate this as an exploitation of personal loss, we can view it as this 
writer's attempt to manage her losses using photography as a metaphor. In "stealing" the 
photographs of her as a child, her father strips her of a certain level of control in the 
telling of her life story. The theft begins with an act of violence—for sixteen years, her 
only memory of her father, from when she was a toddler, is his physical abuse of her 
mother—and this violence is a past event that continually threatens her present. However, 
by speaking of (but not revealing) the lost photographs, and by imaginatively mixing 
them with all the other photographs that have "narrated" her life for her, she attains a 
degree of control. Note that her powerful narrative voice is welded to the absent 
photographs. The writer acknowledges that language distorts her self-image, but by 
keeping her photographs "silent" and speaking on their behalf, this acknowledgment 
becomes an assertion of rhetorical power, a new voice with which to narrate her own 
history. Her childhood photographs become more referential than if they had actually 
been included in the essay. To have seen them, I think, would have weakened their 
rhetorical force. In Rugg's words, writing in the absence of images from a damaged 
childhood—writing so that their absence is felt as a narrative presence—allows the life 
writer to "[reverse] the process of looking at photographs to create or gain access to 
memory," and to instead "[use] her memory to gain access to photographs" (201). This 
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"magical" belief in the referential power of photography, in other words, provides depth 
and persuasive force to this writer's voice. I imagine that this is an idea Barthes, 
Emerson, and Macrorie would all find agreeable. 
What I have been aiming for here is a style of autobiography, using words and 
images, that can reveal the connections between aesthetics and the ethical challenges of 
being a writer. Poststructuralism has shown us these challenges most forcefully, but no 
writer who has ever attempted to write autobiography needs critical theory to know that it 
is a troubling genre. Authentic subjectivity is elusive, and taking too simple an approach 
to it can obscure the larger rhetorical demands of the autobiographical text. This is what 
makes "life writing" an ethically charged genre: to confront the limits of one's authorial 
self, but to keep writing in spite of those limitations, is to confront the ways that personal 
history is always also a social history. Autobiography shows us the "other" that resides 
within our own intimate sense of self. 
The first two chapters of this dissertation have tried to show that aesthetics and 
ethics are closely intertwined. Chapter III moves even further in this direction, looking at 
how the research essay—a genre traditionally based on fact, objective observation, the 
impartial presentation of an empirical eye—poses particular aesthetic and ethical 
challenges. When combined with photography—once considered to be the height of 
objective data—we find that the facts of the world cannot be viewed beyond the aesthetic 
parameters of our modes of representation. By combining modes, however, we can 
sometimes produce aesthetic affects that draw students more deeply into the rhetorical 
act. Such multimodality is where photography, research writing, and surrealism meet. 
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CHAPTER III 
SEEKING WITH A "WILD EYE": PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE RESEARCH ESSAY 
Photographs entice viewers by their silence, the mysterious beckoning of 
another world. It is as enigmas, opaque and inexplicable as the living world 
itself, that they most resemble the data upon which history is based. 
—Alan Trachtenberg, Reading American Photographs (xvi-xvii). 
Relying on "the modes of discourse," such as "Narration" or "Argument," to 
guide and categorize student writing, Bob Connors contended, is a sterile pedagogy that 
has little to do with the actual purposes writers have for composing, which explains why 
it fell from favor in the 1950s ("The Rise and Fall of the Modes of Discourse" ). Yet 
when I ask students fresh from high school how to write a research paper, many of them 
consistently give me the "correct" answer. They know they are to mention what the 
paper's going to be about in the first paragraph ("intro"), write about that in the next three 
("body") paragraphs, then remind the reader about those three points in the final 
paragraph ("conclusion"). All that is trite and uninspiring about modal thinking seems to 
have been resuscitated in the form of the "five-paragraph" essay. While not a mode per 
se, the five-paragraph essay is a pseudo-rhetorical form to which many new college 
students cling. It is easy to mock how little this form actually advances us toward "new 
knowledge," and easy to laugh at ourselves for once having relied on it. Eventually, 
however, students will need to present 
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their research without it, which can cause great consternation in those who have relied on 
this cookie-cutter model as their primary means of presenting scholarly research. 
Broadly speaking, it is no wonder students tend to see personal narratives as easy 
and research writing as hard—a phenomenon that cannot, I think, simply be explained 
away with the lament that students lack discipline. The first kind of writing deals with 
experiences and concepts that are supposedly interior and familiar to, at home in, the 
subjectivity of the writer, and so seem to encourage a kind of narrative play and 
openness. The latter kind deals with ideas that are supposedly external and foreign to the 
writer, and so seem to demand the rhetorical "control" promised by the five-paragraph 
form. (Students occasionally ask if they can include "personal opinion" in a research 
essay, which reveals how deeply research writing is split off in their imagination from 
personal narrative). In this binarized understanding, the five-paragraph model is a 
machine: Pour in information gleaned from one's notes and flash cards, and out comes 
the voice of "scholarship," cleansed of the writer's lack of confidence and authority. 
Personal narrative, conversely, can make playful use of "opinion," of ready-at-hand, 
subjective knowledge. This chapter takes an interdisciplinary approach to examine how a 
photographic pedagogy can challenge this reductive dichotomy, and to reexamine the 
purposes of and possibilities for research writing. 
Aesthetics, Politics, and Research with a Purpose 
In Composition, research writing has been deemed a problematic genre, at best. In 
the 1980s, James Ford and Dennis Perry found that over eighty percent of first-year 
Composition courses and forty percent of advanced Composition courses had a research 
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requirement (827), though there were greatly divergent views as to its value. Some 
department chairs saw the requirement as pointless, some thought it was helpful for 
students planning to attend graduate school, and some saw it as a chance for students "to 
develop discipline and a scholarly attitude" (830). While these results are dated, I see no 
reason to suspect that the percentages have gone down. 
The fact that research writing is so widespread does not mean it is being practiced 
well. In Writing in the Academic Disciplines, David Russell noted that the research paper, 
modeled on the German scientific paper, was once an effective for of scholarly 
apprenticeship for American college students, but after the compartmentalization of 
academic disciplines in the late nineteenth century (7-8), the research paper, in becoming 
"ubiquitous, relatively uniform" (78), lost whatever force it once had.. Such statistical 
and historical scholarship suggests that today, many students and writing teachers are 
made to wrestle with an assignment that Robert Davis and Mark Shadle call 
"disrespected and omnipresent, trite and vital, central to modern academic discourse, yet 
a part of our own duties as teachers of writing that we seldom discuss" (417). 
Of course, many Compositionists do discuss it. Richard Larson maintains that 
while research is indeed an activity that is central to academic life across the disciplines, 
what often gets assigned at the end of the freshman Composition course bears little" 
resemblance to the purposeful, context- and discipline-specific texts created at the more 
advanced levels of academia. For Larson, the "research paper" in first year Composition 
ends up being a "Non-form of writing," a "generic, cross-disciplinary term" with "no 
conceptual or substantive identity" that merely turns writing programs into a "service" 
industry for other departments (813, 816). A similar distaste for the generic prescriptions 
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of the "research report" probably helped fuel Ken Macrorie's "I-Search," which asks 
students to write in first-person and to include extensive self-reflection in the presentation 
of their research. Macrorie's approach, especially, is premised on the idea that when the 
topic of research is personally meaningful to the writer, the resulting text will exhibit a 
sense of purpose that is lacking in traditionally assigned research. This calls for an 
aesthetically sophisticated approach to teaching writing. In contrast, Diana George writes 
that the problem with research assignments, especially as they have been taught in 
textbooks, is they do not ask students to make meaning from, or think critically about, 
their source materials, often requiring "little more than a research report" ("Using the 
Research Paper to Teach Critical Thinking" 27). As opposed to Macrorie, who allows 
more freedom in the picking of a topic, she requires all students to research a single 
content area (30). Furthermore, she dismisses Macrorie's inquiry-based research model, 
which she calls, "at best, a baby step" (29) toward critical thinking. George calls for 
"informed, clear, and developed ... prose" that "[increases] awareness of the complexity 
of social reality" (31). This is a more critically oriented approach, in which the student 
writer's aesthetic awareness is less important than the political awareness he can achieve 
through writing. 
With Macrorie and George so polarized, it seems Composition is divided between 
aesthetical (interior, subjective, personal) and political (exterior, objective, social) ways 
of seeing the world. Of course, this is a bad faith description of what is actually a shifting 
and overdetermined state of affairs. Politics can be aestheticized, art can be politicized, 
and subjectivity articulates itself differently in each of these contexts. I don't have the 
room in this chapter to re-articulate Composition's many historical and theoretical 
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insights into aesthetics and politics, or to elaborate on the historical relationship between 
the two terms. I will point out, however, that scholarship on research writing inevitably 
attempts to put them into conversation, either explicitly or implicitly. My argument here 
accepts a priori that there is always a rapport between politics and aesthetics—between 
the discursive and material distribution of power in a society, and that society's sense of 
beauty, taste, and style. But how the two categories are linked determines other important 
details, especially when photography is involved. More to the point, in Composition, 
aesthetically based pedagogies tend to be more invested in personal writing, and 
politically based pedagogies place more emphasis on civic argumentation. Throughout 
the last decade or so, Compositionists have come up with innovative ways to challenge 
this seemingly natural bifurcation of the field—ways, as I will show, that have often 
relied heavily on photography. 
For instance, in Rhetorics, Poetics, and Cultures, James Berlin criticizes the 
denigration of rhetoric in the history of Western thought, which he insists has resulted in 
a "poetic-rhetoric binary" in contemporary English departments (10). To overcome this 
split, he introduces film, television, literature, and critical reading into his classrooms 
(126-37), and students conduct multimedia research into these cultural texts, including 
producing their own videos (137). Berlin's pedagogy is clearly more on the political side 
of the binary, as his attention to aesthetics is largely restricted to producing critical 
readers, not designers, of cultural discourse. In "From Analysis to Design," Diana 
George, though also prioritizing politics over aesthetics, goes further in attending to the 
materials and material history of literacy, and actively has students get their hands and 
eyes, as well as their critical minds, involved in the research process. Taking into 
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consideration the material artifacts, practices, and histories that produce contemporary 
literacy (see Trimbur, "Review of Multiliteracies: Literacy Learning and the Design of 
Social Futures"; Faigley, "Material Literacy and Visual Design"), George attends to the 
"multiliteracies" (see Chapter I of this dissertation) that comprise human culture, and 
asks students to include these many ways of looking and knowing into their research 
projects. Overall, this group of scholars contend that alphabetic literacy does not 
adequately describe how literate meaning is created today, and furthermore that 
"alphabetic text [has always] had 'multimedia' ambitions," as Richard Lanham puts it 
(128). This group also largely downplays or ignores the affective processes (delight, 
shock, disgust, etc.) involved with different modes of representation, as I argue in chapter 
one. 
Matthew Wilson also turns aesthetics toward political ends. He argues that 
Richard Larson's "washing-his-hands-of-the-whole-mess" (241) approach to the research 
assignment (mentioned above) is not helpful for teachers who are required to assign a 
research paper. The research assignment, Wilson states, can actually cultivate in students 
a "delight in the unexpected and incongruous," in the "uncanny" playfulness, which is 
indicative of the literary essay (248). In appealing to terms such as "delight" and 
"uncanny," Wilson distances research writing from its roots in the science report, a genre 
which "denies uncertainty and ambiguity" (243) and positions writing as something that 
happens after the pertinent facts have been collected. Rather, the pertinent facts and their 
meaning emerge only within (not in spite of) the writing process. Wilson's discourse is 
politically useful, he contends, because it is modeled after James Clifford's postmodern 
ethnography, which deploys Surrealism in order to disrupt the too-easy cooptation of 
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ethnographic data by a bourgeois viewing public. Citing Clifford, Wilson argues that the 
student who is asked to write a research paper—in both positivistic and expressivistic 
pedagogies—is like a nineteenth-century British ethnographer, whose totalizing vision of 
the exotic Other hides "the research situation's ambiguities and diversities of meaning" 
(253). To counteract this totalizing vision, postmodern ethnography harnesses the art 
practices of the surrealists, fragmenting and defamiliarizing the researched data and thus 
forcing the viewer (and the student researcher) to recognize their complicity in the 
construction of that data. However, citing David Bartholomae, Wilson also asserts, rather 
matter-of-factly, that it is "wrong to teach late-adolescents that writing is an expression of 
individual thoughts and feelings," since such writing only allows a student to produce 
"reasonably competent sentimental narratives," not academically sophisticated discourse 
(251). Wilson's conjoining of aesthetics and politics, in other words, disallows personal 
narrative, and does not acknowledge expressivism's equal (but different) investment in 
ambiguity and uncertainty. 
At any rate, a sense of "delight in the unexpected and incongruous" is a 
productive trait for the researcher, and it features prominently in pedagogies that make 
use of the visual. In '"Building a Mystery': Alternative Research Writing and the 
Academic Act of Seeking," Davis and Shadle also encourage "uncertainty, passionate 
exploration, and mystery" (418), but go further to embrace both scholarly research 
conventions and aesthetic strategies traditionally practiced by expressivist teachers. The 
authors distinguish four forms of research writing, to be taught in a sequence—first a 
research argument, then a personal research paper, then a research essay, and finally a 
multi-media research project—and, though there is probably more overlap between these 
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categories than the authors suggest (440), the distinctions show research writing to be a 
serious and intellectual but also expansive and playful act of writing. In the tradition of 
Tom Romano's multi-genre essay, they encourage the use of visual artifacts in their 
student texts, as equal but different forms of communication (435), and make room for 
personal writing throughout the entire sequence. 
In "Learning to Trust the Twelfth Picture on the Roll," Bruce Ballenger puts these 
concepts into practice, paying particular attention to how photography serves as a 
metaphor for the "processes of searching and discovering" ( "Learning to Trust the 
Twelfth Picture," 33). Circling a subject, photographing it in different kinds of light and 
from different perspectives, provides an "apprenticeship in writing with light," Ballenger 
says—just as curiosity and an aesthetic openness of mind can help one discover 
something unexpected about one's research topic (40). For example, a good nature 
photographer, like a good researcher, does not look for the picture that will simply show 
viewers what they have already seen in any number of landscape images; rather, she aims 
to defamiliarize the landscape, to make it alien, to present a view that is otherwise 
invisible to common, everyday vision. This linking of research to camera work suggests 
that good research creates texts "that shine with the language and methods of the essay," 
since both the essay form and most genres of photography (natural and landscape; 
documentary; portraiture and self-portraiture) promote self-reflection. Even an 
autobiographical essay—like many kinds of photography—isn't necessarily an exercise 
in solipsism, but in fact can become an important kind of intellectual work that much 
contemporary pedagogy rushes past: it makes curiosity a virtue and develops a passion 
for exploration. Photographing and writing personally about the research topic not only 
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produces artifacts for the final paper, but also strengthens the student writer's sense of 
self as an academic researcher, for whom curiosity is a virtue and a passion (39). 
The research pedagogies just reviewed militate against the sterile, limiting vision 
of the traditionally conceived "research report." Each holds a unique conversation about 
aesthetics and politics, and each situates personal writing and affect differently. For 
George, the aesthetic power of the visual is only important insofar as it makes a political 
argument; personal writing is irrelevant to visual rhetoric, and affect is left unaddressed. 
For Wilson, affect is central to research (there is a delight in ambiguity) and is generated 
through the aesthetic strategies of ethnographic surrealism. Like George, he mandates a 
single topic of research for the class, and also like George, he eschews personal narrative. 
Teacher-researchers such as Ballenger, Davis, Romano, and Shadle make affect a central 
part of their pedagogies, weaving the sense of mystery and pleasure that comes from 
aesthetic work into the foundation of the research process. For example, they allow 
students to choose their own topics, which affirms that self-reflection leads to a more 
meaningful research process for the student, as well as a more interesting read for the 
teacher. Ballenger, especially, allows aesthetic experimentation to disrupt an easy, 
surface knowledge of the research topic. In this view, camera work provides a useful 
metaphor for the searching and discovering that writers do, in addition to producing 
actual materials for the research paper. Moreover, this pedagogy is also political, in that 
photography is a material practice that disrupts the traditional (and still powerful) notion 
of research writing as a transparent medium that innocently displays "facts" and 
"meaning." I put those words in scare quotes not because facts and meaning don't exist, 
but to point out that knowledge is constructed and that language is not transparent. The 
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material processes involved with composing any sort of photo essay make the 
constructedness of knowledge, we might say, perfectly clear. 
The Surreal Eve as the Researcher's Tool 
It is important for students to look at photographs communally, in small and large 
group sessions. Doing so allows us to build an interpretive community with a shared 
vocabulary and set of viewing practices. For instance, we learn to distinguish between 
denotative and connotative modes of interpretation. I try to keep this distinction simple. 
The first mode of interpretation, I say, is giving an objective account of the material 
details of the image; the second is a way of using these details to interpret the image. We 
also define point-of-view or perspective, which Kress and van Leeuwen describe as 
historically constructed methods for forming a symbolic relation between the viewer and 
the subject of an image (135-57). Whether or not the subject of a photo is viewed from 
above, below, at eye-level and straight on, or from the side, will determine the range of 
relations the viewer is supposed to have with the subject of the image. A view from the 
ground up, for instance, tends to situate the subject of the photo as somehow superior to 
the viewer, whereas the bird's eye perspective will tend to invert that relationship. 
It is good to get students putting these terms into practice as soon as possible. 
Early in the course, I ask them to collect magazine and newspaper advertisements from as 
wide a variety of publications as possible. This is essentially a conventional ad-analysis 
assignment: (1) examine the images side by side; (2) identify ideological patterns that 
emerge; and (3) develop questions that help us understand what those patterns mean. 
Such questions might include: Are women portrayed differently than men? Which kinds 
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of magazines have more white/black/Hispanic/Asian models? Which visual perspectives 
are used most often in ads aimed at mothers/fathers/teenage boys/teenage girls? And so 
forth. Students are invited to consider the ways the concepts presented by these ads have 
influenced their personal lives, or they can undertake a simple compare-and-contrast 
(between, say, images of men and images of women in sports magazines). Either way, 
this semiotic work accomplishes two things: it demonstrates how constructed and 
manipulative the images that surround us can be, and it gives us some analytical tools that 
can be applied to the other work of the course. 
We also look for ways that photographers have used the camera as a tool for 
research. For example, Eugene Atget, whose clean, direct views of Paris often reveal 
empty streets. (Go to http://www.gingkopress.com/_cata/imal/atget-il.htm to see several 
of his images). Even though many of these photographs seem to capture a city that is 
momentarily paralyzed and eerily vacant, they pulse with anticipation, as if at any 
moment the scene will be flooded by a mob in violent protest. Examining many of these 
ghostly cityscapes, it is easy to see why Susan Sontag called photography "the only art 
that is natively surreal" (On Photography 51). These images seem to rip bits of the city 
out of a lived context, seem to make buildings and street corners part of an alien 
landscape. When the surrealists fawned over his accomplishment, Atget responded with 
annoyance, saying, "These are simply documents I make." But the surrealists were right, 
these are not simply documents. They haunt us in a way facts in a scientific report do not. 
And yet they also teach us a straightforward lesson about the architectural landscape of 
nineteenth-century Paris. 
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We also look at American documentary photographers, which thickens our 
understanding of a good research project. For example, after reading the "Prologue" to 
Agee and Evans's Let Us Now Praise Famous Men, the class conversation turns to the 
ethical problem of documenting the suffering of others. Agee's rage, his "paralyzing, 
self-lacerating anger," Walker Evans called it, seeps through his tortured prose, and 
students feel it (ix). Some are inspired by his war on the hypocrisy of readers who will 
turn his report on "the cruel radiance of what is" (11) into "Art" (15). Others are 
infuriated by his mockery and derision. This is a good tension to have—it riles us up and 
gets us all to think about the tension between the book's photographs and its words, and 
Agee exploits it: 
If I could do it, I'd do no writing at all here. It would be photographs; the rest 
would be fragments of cloth, bits of cotton, lumps of earth, records of speech, 
pieces of wood and iron, phials of odors, plates of food and of excrement.... A 
piece of the body torn out by the roots might be more to the point. (13) 
We know, as Agee must have, that he had indeed produced a work of art. He shows us 
here what kind of artwork it is: surrealistic. (The surrealistic photograph might be 
described as a "piece of the body torn out by the roots.") To help make sense of Agee's 
astonishing rage and the beauty of his text, the class reads excerpts from Robert Coles' 
Doing Documentary Work, where Coles tells us that Agee's sense of guilt at not having 
done enough stems from the fact that he must have left out quite a bit—he couldn't 
include everything. The documentarian that confronts "the cruel radiance" of raw, 
everyday reality must carve into that reality as a storyteller, must treat the complex events 
there as characters in a story. It is a kind of fiction that for Agee did not do justice to 
those he studied, but that needed to be told. As Coles puts it: 
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We who cut, weave, edit, splice, crop, sequence, interpolate, interject, 
connect, pan, come up with our captions and comments, have our say 
(whenever and wherever and however) have thereby linked our lives to those 
we have attempted to document, creating a joint presentation for an audience 
that may or may not have been asked to consider all that has gone into what 
they are reading, hearing, or viewing. (100) 
To understand the researched text as more than simply the tranquil representation of 
"facts," then, Agee and Coles ask us to see their topics in the way Barthes sees the 
photograph: as a bit of reality "torn out by the roots." Photography in its surrealistic mode 
is right at home in such research. 
Because photographs can do no more than rip moments out of their original time 
and context, they enact what James Clifford calls "ethnographic surrealism" (117-51). 
The reality that is presented by Renaissance humanism as a transparent vehicle for Truth, 
is broken into pieces by Modernity—the fragmenting of knowledge by our heavily 
mediated, sound-bite-oriented culture—that must then be found by the flaneur and re-
assembled by the bricoleur. As surrealist art critic Carl Einstein wrote in 1929, "The 
uninterrupted fabric of this reality is torn," and only a research method sensitive to this 
fragmentation can effectively bring the aesthetic and the political onto the same page 
together (quoted in Clifford 130). In asking students to conduct research with a 
photographic eye, we ask them to take on the role of the flaneur and bricoleur, the 
hedonistic observer and the junk collecting artist. All the aesthetic strategies of surrealism 
are needed to produce the photographic research essay: "strolling" around with a camera, 
finding unique juxtapositions, freewriting and jotting down one's thoughts in a journal. 
And once the photographs have been taken and developed, the writer-designer uses 
collage, montage, doubling, mise en abime, blurring, and incongruous methods of 
captioning images to create a "delight in the unexpected and incongruous," a playfulness 
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that takes the difficulty of representation very seriously. (Sample Assignment #2 is an 
example of this kind of "wild eyed" seeking.) 
Of course, the value of this approach needs to answer the ground zero question: 
Will this help students become better writers? To that I can only answer anecdotally, and 
say that asking students to produce photo essays encourages a kind of experimentation 
that I have not seen in non-visual writing assignments. Once they begin to take 
photographs, writers understand that the space of their inquiry is no longer confined to 
the space of the page. For example, a student who had been working at McDonald's since 
he was a freshman in high school, took pictures of two of his fellow employees, then 
stapled each photograph to a piece of paper that included a brief description of the 
subject's personality, as well as a note from the subject him- or herself. The notes from 
the subjects are in their own handwriting, and they respond to the question, "If you could 
have a job anywhere else in the world, where would it be?" He then placed the photo 
essays—part biography, part autobiography, part field notes—into food containers from 
the restaurant: the hefty young African American man with coke bottle glasses was rolled 
up into an oval French fry container; an older white woman who wanted to "work at 
home" was slid into an apple pie box. The writer "began" the essay on a store napkin: 
I sit in the bathroom, it is 2:30 AM on a Friday night. The smoke from my 
cigarette pools around my head. I write this to you, all of the people who 
come here after midnite, And in your drunken state expect to be worshipped. 
I have this to tell you as you scream into the order box, I can hear you. I have 
this to tell you person stealing from McDonald's, I know what you're doing, I 
know your order, I gave you everything you asked for. I have this to tell you 
if you make a wiseass remark, like "no spit please," we are humans, not 
animals, not McRobots. We are Men and Women stuck in shit jobs, making 
ends, but no more, we work 9, 10, 11 hours a day, without a break. We have 
wives, families, and bills. This is no sob story it is just a call for basic human 
respect. What follows is a combo meal of reality, stories from two people, 
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real stories, about friends, family, and struggle. Enjoy, And Please Come 
Again. 
Out of this first draft, which by itself was a rapturous and risky piece of 
writing, the student produced two more drafts, holding on to the motif of fast food boxes, 
cups and napkins through each. By the third draft, he had included information about the 
benefits provided to McDonald's employees, two additional photographs and bios of 
other co-workers, as well as newspaper clippings dealing with cases of violence and cruel 
behavior toward restaurant employees. The final version included a Works Cited page 
written on the inside of a Chicken McNugget's container. Each material artifact had the 
gritty presence of something "torn out by the roots," or of found photographs collaged 
into a seamless statement. In this project—which beautifully attends to both public and 
private aspects of working class angst and camaraderie—personal narrative, aesthetic 
experimentation, political fire, and the rubbish of our culture collide in words and 
pictures. 
This dissertation has presented a range of activities that move students through 
activities that increase in rhetorical, ethical, and aesthetic complexity: Chapter I 
introduces ways of looking and designing that aren't explicitly related to political or 
ethical life, but that have ethical resonances; Chapter II discusses aesthetic strategies that 
produce ethical implications for the authorial self; and this chapter shows one writer 
using photography and research writing to turn his work experiences into a case study of 
the dehumanizing possibilities of minimum wage labor in one American workplace. 
Throughout, this progression from one assignment to the next has never valued thinking 
about politics, ethics, or morality over aesthetic concerns. I have tried to show that the 
artful and the ethical are two necessary aspects of a single, organic, rhetorical process of 
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composition. This organic relation never fades in student writing, even when students are 
dealing with the most pressing political issues. Chapter IV pushes this claim to its 
furthest limit. It continues to view aesthetics as a significant aspect of our politically and 
morally complex world, but it does so in light of historical events—and photographs— 
that are the most disturbing and morally challenging images our world has ever recorded. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISTURBING PLEASURE: PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE IM/POSSIBLE ETHICS OF 
CATASTROPHE 
Mr. Brady has done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and 
earnestness of war. If he has not brought bodies and laid them in our door-
yards and along the streets, he has done something very like it.... These 
pictures have a terrible distinctness. By the aid of the magnifying-glass, the 
very features of the slain may be distinguished. 
—editorial in The New York Times, October 20, 1862 (Newhall 91, 94) 
Poignant longings for beauty, for an end to probing beneath the surface, for a 
redemption and celebration of the body of the world—all these elements of erotic 
feeling are affirmed in the pleasure we take in photographs. 
—Susan Sontag, On Photography (24) 
There is beauty in ruins. 
—Susan Sontag, Regarding the Pain of Others (76) 
This chapter investigates the cultural significance of disturbing photographs, a term 
Bruce Ballenger and Michelle Payne use to describe images that depict the human body 
mortally wounded or dead, by accident or act of violence. In The Curious Reader, they 
dedicate a chapter to the ethical challenges and uncertainties—faced by newspaper 
editors, photographers, writers, and consumers of the news—involved with determining 
which images are chosen for public presentation and the cultural implications of doing so. 
As it is part of a book designed to guide college writing students through the details and 
processes of scholarly investigation, the authors' treatment of the topic scrupulously 
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avoids prescriptive claims, relying instead on interdisciplinary readings and broad 
questions to establish the topic's complexity. These readings and questions do an 
excellent job of addressing the ethical challenges such images pose to public discourse 
and journalistic practice. 
What for me is most striking about the Curious Reader chapter, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, is its use of images that are disturbing. The full chapter title, "Reading 
and Writing across Disciplines: The Ethics of Publishing Disturbing Photos," suggests an 
exercise in rhetorical analysis revolving around a particularly vexing public issue. The 
coolness of such a description belies the visceral impact of the images. Even though they 
are tightly woven into the structure of the chapter—only photos needed to exemplify the 
debates are shown—it is easy to lose track of the argument at hand and be caught up in 
the affective pull of visual shock. Even now, as I thumb through the chapter, I oscillate 
between an interest in the rhetorical gestures the writers make and a feeling of 
helplessness in the face of human devastation. The image of Iraqis celebrating over the 
charred corpses of American contractors, to take one example (The Curious Reader 439), 
disturbs me on multiple levels: because these men were ruthlessly murdered; because the 
men and boys in the image, presumably Iraqis, are euphoric in this violence; because my 
gut response to the image is not sensitive enough to the horror and cultural ruin Iraq has 
experienced; because I can very clearly see the ravaged corpse. In the grip of such 
disturbed feelings, fleeting and ambivalent as they may be, verbal arguments feel 
inadequate. Even embedded in an essay dealing with the "professional codes, ethical 
constraints, and thoughtful uncertainty" of news editors, and bound in a textbook for 
college writers, a photograph can disturb its rhetorical framework (446). I believe the 
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field of Composition needs more attempts, like Ballenger and Payne's, to address this 
issue and that ask the academic reader to confront the ways photographs of catastrophe 
disturb, for better and worse, the enactment of pedagogy. 
There have been few such attempts. Two that do, and from which I derive some 
of the key questions of this chapter, are Michael Bernard-Donals's "Forgetful Memory 
and Images of the Holocaust" and Diana George and Diane Shoo's "Deflecting the 
Political in the Visual Images of Execution and the Death Penalty Debate." While 
Bernard-Donals focuses on Holocaust photographs, George and Shoos on images of 
public execution and the death penalty, both texts make a broader claim about all visual 
representations of atrocity—in sum, that the collective memory of any atrocity is 
constructed by a vast archive of artifacts (mainly photographs but also movies, novels, 
biographies, newspaper accounts, family anecdotes), and that this archival remembrance 
tends to hide or misrepresent a more complex and urgent reality. 
The two essays grapple with the need to look more carefully at history and its 
images, beyond the usual narratives to be found in many commemorative sites (especially 
films and photo exhibitions). Both find common forms of remembrance lacking in 
accuracy and substance, and provide interpretive strategies that encourage a more 
sophisticated ethics of looking. Bernard-Donals, who promotes a kind of engagement 
with historical trauma he calls "forgetful memory," teaches us to read such images across 
the grain—to find in them details that reveal something radically unique and unexpected 
about the objects of the photo, and hence that interrupt the illusion that collective 
memory speaks for, or allows us to identify with, the victims of atrocity. He praises 
visual artists who distort the iconic photographs of the Holocaust by painting over, 
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scratching out, or otherwise defacing them, "in such a way that the blot itself becomes the 
object of memory" (396). "What we're left with is just that loss," he writes of these 
photographs that represent something beyond the iconic Holocaust image, "not a 
knowledge of what happened" but of "something that simply can't be written, at least not 
in terms of our or our culture's memory" (392). By disfiguring the conventional routes of 
memory, in other words, these images force the viewer into an uncomfortable relation to 
the past—one that functions, as a muted or secondary trauma, to disturb what we think 
we can know or feel about a destructive history (395, 399, 401n). 
Diana George and Diane Shoos, likewise, wish to disturb a pat relation to the past, 
but in their case, the relevant kind of memory is more political than historical. In their 
study of visual representations of public executions—contemporary, state mandated 
killings as well as those incited by mob violence, particularly the racially motivated 
lynchings that were prominent in the American South during the early twentieth 
century—the authors find two kinds of vision, witnessing and voyeurism, that inflect the 
relation of the visual to political life. Witness designates "an inherently political act that 
brings an event to the public for scrutiny," whereas voyeurism "denotes seeing or 
watching that evokes gratification or pleasure of some sort," registered as "a shift in 
power from the person or event being seen to the observer of that event" (590). There are 
specific conventions to visual representation, they argue, that can help a viewer to resist 
the pull of "seamy voyeurism" (589) and to witness the fundamental public questions at 
hand—primarily, not whether an inmate on death row is innocent or guilty, but whether 
the state ever has the right, in the first place, to take his life. 
In these two articles, what is most similar is their understanding that pleasure 
should be disturbed when looking at images of catastrophe."11 would like to investigate 
this concept of voyeurism or pleasurable looking, as it is often figured as a primary 
reason for the loss, deflection, or forgetting of political and historical meaning. For 
George and Shoos, we must militate against the pleasures of "popular visual narratives" 
and insist on a way of seeing that rejects simplistic and widespread responses to difficult 
cultural problems (588). For Bernard-Donals, we must learn to reject the pleasure of 
over-identifying with the suffering of victims—or trying to claim "surrogate victimage," 
as Dominick LaCapra has called it (182)—as well as the pleasure that comes from a 
presumptuous "knowledge" of the historical facts of a traumatic event."11 Faced with 
images of humanity's endless capacity for cruelty, these authors call for a highly 
educated response that will sustain the atrocity as a disturbing presence in our intellectual 
and emotional lives, rather than as lurid spectacle or historical trivia. This begs the 
question of how pleasure enters our vision in the first place, and why (since it shadows 
vision at every turn) it is not a legitimate response to a traumatized past. I take up that 
question now, as I consider the ways American photographic culture has taken shape 
around, but never totally come to terms with, the viewing public's scopophilic relation to 
catastrophe. 
The Exquisite Corpse 
As we have just seen, photography has the power to expose the body in a direct 
and disquieting way. War photography is probably the most enduring example of 
this—unless pornography is. The "terrible distinctness" of Civil War photography, as the 
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first epigraph at the beginning of this chapter suggests, allowed the American public to 
gaze at the cadavers of war for the first time on a massive scale. In his sweeping The 
History of Photography from 1839 to the Present, Beaumont Newhall writes of the first 
extensive collection of war photographs, taken of the Crimean War by Roger Fenton, that 
they lacked a close view of dead bodies. To "a public used to the conventional fantasies 
of romantic battle painters, these photographs seemed dull, yet they recognized in them 
the virtue of the camera as a faithful witness." There seems to have been a default faith in 
war photography as an utterly objective depiction of what happens on the battlefield, but 
the public was not fascinated or even titillated by Fenton's images, as Newhall indicates 
with this quote from the American Journal of Photography of 1862: "The photographer 
who follows in the wake of modern armies must be content with conditions of repose and 
with the still life which remains when the fighting is over" (88). Newspaper editors knew 
that these images, though "real," did not convey the visceral reality of war. 
Advancements in camera mechanics and photochemical processes would quickly 
change this. Civil War photographers were the first, on a large scale, to use photography 
to "cadaverize" the American imagination. Although still photographs of the human 
body—eroticized or pornographic or as corpse—had already become a part of photo 
archives throughout the world, Matthew Brady, Alexander Gardner, and Timothy 
O'Sullivan were the first to place images of the human corpse in the "door-yards" of 
America, as a mass journalistic enterprise. These photographers and those who followed 
their lead had "done something to bring home to us the terrible reality and earnestness of 
war," inaugurating a new relationship between the foreignness of war and the visual lives 
of citizens at home. Echoing Andre Bazin's proposal that photography has finally 
satisfied our psychological desire for a precise representation of reality, Newhall writes 
that 
corpses abound in battle paintings since the Renaissance.... But O'Sullivan's 
rifleman, lying in death, is a portrait. This man lived; this is the spot where he 
fell; this is how he looked at the very moment when he expired. Therein lies 
the great psychological difference between photography and the other arts; 
this is the quality that photography can transmit more strongly than can any 
other picture making. (94) 
In Newhall's lyrical treatment of this epoch in our nation's history, we see his 
reverence for the achievement of Civil War photographers, their bravery in the heat of 
battle and their technical resourcefulness and virtuosity. These alone are compelling 
historical facts. However, what most fascinated the early viewers of Civil War 
photography, it seems, was not the enormous amount of death and destruction caused by 
the war, or the scope of its political ramifications, but that these images exposed actual 
human carnage with supernatural clarity. Though the sight of a human corpse may be 
(initially) shocking, such imagery is ultimately fascinating because it is photographic. 
When Newhall writes, "This man lived; this is the spot where he fell; this is how he 
looked at the very moment when he expired," his clipped, almost tautological utterances 
point to the camera's work. The nearness of the corrupted body, in a photo, is stunning. 
Unlike Fenton's images of the Crimean War, which, though accurate and perhaps even 
beautiful, were "dull" because corpse-less, the realism of these images festered in the 
American. 
This stunned relation with the pictured corpse is certainly a response to war, but 
of what kind? How did these early photographs structure our nation's responsiveness to 
and remembrance of cultural destruction? Do such images convey the "earnestness" of 
war, its "true" dimensions? Did the Times writer's "view" of war change after he saw 
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photographs of corrupted bodies? Is he more ethically sensitive to the war, or less? Does 
photography's supernatural clarity give a more direct access to the horrific nature of war, 
or does it insert a kind of distance between the viewer and reality, interrupting his 
capacity to think critically about the complex machinations of national politics, 
propaganda, and the mediated nature of subjectivity? That is, does the corpse in the 
"door-yard" become an endpoint of critical thought, or its beginning? By tapping into the 
mind's fascination with representations of the body, especially the body corrupted or 
disquieted, these images seem to make war more real. It would seem that today, still, the 
photograph of the corpse is a watermark for the reality of mortal conflict. Out of this 
affective state that haunts the moment of looking at human devastation, what ethical or 
political claims can be made? 
More is at stake here than a remembrance of any single event and its photography. 
Considering the problems this list of questions evokes—the human fascination with 
images of the body, the photograph's tendency to decontextualize political issues, the 
dubious ethical status of war images—we can see that historically photography has 
played a large role in how and what our culture remembers or forgets. Rather than seeing 
these questions as restricted to war and its photography, in other words, we will position 
them at the head of a broader investigation into the ethics of looking. What might such 
questions offer writing teachers? First of all, they can help us to identify the ways our 
culture represents catastrophe, and to analyze how these representational practices 
encourage or inhibit a workable relation to a traumatized historical record. They might 
also give us a more competent means of reading individual student texts that deal with or 
have been marked by trauma, helping us teach the vertiginously difficult notion that there 
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is a relationship between public history, strategies of representation, and subjective 
memory, and that this triangular relation is manifested in the ways we write about death, 
war, and personal loss. And for those of us interested in teaching the photo-essay, a 
sophisticated understanding of this sort can help us articulate to our students, other 
teachers, and administrators why a photographic pedagogy is an important part of an 
ethically and aesthetically relevant education in the humanities. 
War Photography as Encrypted Pornography 
Any in-depth consideration of photography's history reveals profound 
connections between photographic practice and human desire. Not only the choice of 
subject matter and the moment of clicking the shutter, but also how we archive, frame, 
and display our photographs, reveal something about how we desire them to be imagined 
by other eyes, how we desire them to touch upon and reanimate the past. Working with 
photography in any capacity—as amateur photographer, fashion agent, school yearbook 
compiler, photo-essayist, recorder of family events, military apologist, scientist, art critic 
or collector—is a means of working on the past, making claims on it, producing an 
affective relationship between future viewers and the historic reality supposedly captured 
by the image. Excluding images meant to provide purely technical information (e.g., 
satellite stills used by military strategists—though clearly the use of these may also be 
guided by particular political desires), photographs now play an active role in shaping 
what we remember, as well as how we remember, that is, how we should feel about a past 
event while looking at images of it. It is not hard to imagine that the act of looking at the 
past, in this age of photographic remembering, is fraught with confusions between what 
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we see and what we want or need to see. The ethical status of photographic looking and 
remembering is anything but certain. Many artists, journalists, and teachers share Barbie 
Zelizer's concern that photography might divert us from responding appropriately to the 
traumatic events of contemporary history, or as she puts it, might hinder our ability to 
"develop representational forms ... that nourish moral response" (220). 
As a fundamental example of the uncertain moral condition of photography in 
responding to human disaster, consider the relation between graphic war images and 
pornography. Photographic treatments of war have often been equated with or accused of 
pandering to a kind of pornographic curiosity (e.g., Sontag, On Photography 15, and 
Regarding the Pain of Others 41; Struk 204-07). In some instances, the pornographic 
quality of the image can be defined conventionally, as an exploitation of the body, 
intended to arouse sexual excitement. In Photographing the Holocaust, Janina Struk 
notes a disagreement between Sharon Muller and James Taylor—respectively, the photo 
archivist and curator at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum—regarding the museum's 
possession of photographs depicting "a savage public assault on women" in Lvov in 
(72). Muller was uncomfortable displaying the disturbing, graphic images, condemning 
them as "basically pornographic" (204), whereas Taylor saw them as "the worst 
photographs of the Holocaust" and maintained that "for this reason they should be 
shown." "It is because they show women that they shock in the way that photography 
can, and so might, presumably," Struk concludes, "be arousing to some people" (205). 
An aroused response of this sort, Struk suggests, goes against the kind of ethical 
responsiveness the Museum should inspire in its visitors. 
I l l 
In other instances, the pornographic quality is defined according to the way the 
viewer is allowed and, in certain contexts, encouraged to revel in a long, uninhibited gaze 
at the photographic subject matter. In this case, it is not only the Composition of the 
image, but the viewer's response, especially as that response manifests a kind of scopic 
pleasure, that marks it as pornographic. In Struk's research through thousands of 
Holocaust photographs, for example, what she found more disturbing than the generically 
pornographic images (photos of explicit sexual brutality and of corpses) were those of the 
"constant repetition of low-level harassment—taunting, jeering, pushing, poking—[which 
were] sometimes more difficult to look at than more overtly horrific images" (206). This 
is pornography, Struk contends. Along these lines she critiques propaganda created by the 
Nazis, but also that produced by the Allies as a means of combating Nazi ideology. 
Allied propaganda, in its use of atrocity images that flowed into the U.S. from Poland and 
Russia in the early years of the war, also compromised the dignity of its photographed 
subjects. But even in the case of images in which the body is not corrupted, whether or 
not they are "perp" photos (images produced by the Nazis or, more generally, the 
perpetrators), Struk identifies a pornographic impulse to look which dehumanizes those 
subjects to whom it is urgent we respond with empathy (215).xm For Struk, the fact that 
many such images have been preserved in our most revered memory sites does not keep 
them from turning the Holocaust into a source of commercial profit and aesthetic 
pleasure.xlv 
In the most general terms, then, for both overtly and covertly pornographic 
images, or for any image intended as a witness to catastrophic history, distance seems to 
pose an ethical challenge. We are either too far away from the event, or else the affective 
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distance, between the body in the image and our own, is collapsed. For Struk, the 
specularity of photography too often functions as a distancing device: to look in this way 
is to install an insuperable gap between self and other, to derive pleasure from this gap, 
and thus to shunt the possibility of an empathic connection between viewer and viewed. 
Either that, or our look erases a very real distance, one that cannot and should not be 
bridged, by appropriating the suffering of another as if it were one's own. 
In this argument, over-amplifying or collapsing this distance is a means of not 
responding to catastrophic reality, by subordinating the political and historical context of 
these photographs to the neurotic needs of the ego. For Struk, the indiscriminate 
commercialization and consumption of images of war atrocities, displayed in official and 
unofficial memory sites, colludes with wartime propaganda. To look at these images 
now—to be titillated by photographs of the corrupted body, to experience human 
devastation as a euphoric confrontation with images of death, brutality, and public 
humiliation—is to extend the psychological brutality of fascism. The wrong kind of look 
participates, in a muted and perhaps unconscious way, in the aestheticisation of human 
suffering. It seems that looking at disturbing photography is doomed to ignite an erotic 
interaction (either enthrallment with the object as an erotic object, or disavowal of the 
historical difference between the victim's suffering and the viewer's life in the present) 
regardless of the photographer's intentions or the viewer's political inclinations. 
Sontag's Negative Epiphany and the Critique of Pleasure 
There is no need to restrict our thinking here to images of war. One of the founding 
moments in a broader cultural critique of photography as a threat to empathy was Susan 
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Sontag's On Photography, published in 1977, which asserted that our capacity to respond 
appropriately to the suffering of others is degraded by the world's glut of photographic 
images. Acknowledging that, on the one hand, seeing an image of atrocity makes that 
atrocity more real, and yet, on the other hand, seeing too many images of atrocity dulls 
our sense of its reality, Sontag positions photography as both a redemptive aspect of 
modernity and its originary curse (18, 20). For the Sontag of 1977, it is mostly a curse. 
The endless supply of photographic images has seared open an abyss between reality and 
its overly aestheticised reception by the bourgeoisie: 
Photographs shock insofar as they show something novel. Unfortunately, the 
ante keeps getting raised—partly through the very proliferation of such 
images of horror [as those taken during the liberation of the death camps in 
Poland]. One's first encounter with the photographic inventory of ultimate 
horror is a kind of revelation, the prototypically modern revelation: a 
negative epiphany. (19) 
Sontag presents us here with a paradox. First of all, on an unmatched scale, photography 
offers an epiphany—a visual experience so stunning in its force it presents itself 
negatively, as an absence of lucidity and understanding. The negative epiphany induced 
by certain images is so novel, so new and uninterpretable, that the mind's capacity for 
explanatory narrative is temporarily put out of service. When first facing photographs of 
corrupted, catastrophized bodies, vision serves not as a passive means of registering 
experience—as happens with common, everyday looking—but as a wound, as sight 
ravaged. No narrative provides understanding, since the reality presented there seems to 
exceed the imagination. Merely to look at such images, in other words, risks something 
like a traumatic encounter. Sontag offers as an example her own childhood experience of 
seeing images from Bergen-Belsen and Dachau, which divided her life into "before and 
after" the moment of looking: "When I looked at those photographs, something broke. 
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Some limit had been reached, and not only that of horror; I felt irrevocably grieved, 
wounded, but a part of my feelings started to tighten; something went dead; something is 
still crying" (20). When confronting such a limit-event, Sontag suggests, horrific images 
serve an ethical function. They rupture normal, everyday ways of looking—particularly 
the disinterested gaze of the leisure class—by denying the disaster any access to beauty. 
The horror of the pictured event is un-aesthetic to the bone, presented so clearly, plainly, 
that it cannot be transcended by the hedonistic, bourgeois expectation of aesthetic 
pleasure. Words are unsatisfactory and perhaps unnecessary in such extreme moments. 
On the other side of this paradox, the endless proliferation and public display of 
catastrophe images—which, Sontag observes, have "gained the status of ethical reference 
points"—weakens the empathic force of photography (21). With too much exposure, the 
negative epiphany gives way not only to familiarity but also to a kind of pious sadness, "a 
mournful vision of loss" that produces a sophisticated experience of pleasure (67). The 
"ante keeps getting raised," she warns, meaning that at stake is our ability to avoid a 
morally deadening aestheticism. It becomes imperative that we inscribe political and 
moral narratives onto such images, for only "that which narrates can make us understand" 
(23). To consume the aesthetic pleasures of disaster photography without narrative 
understanding, as if the images "speak for themselves," is to experience the constant flow 
of such images as an aspect of the banal visual environment—that is, as kitsch. 
Presumably, photography, absorbed so thoroughly into capitalism and our sense of the 
mundane, jeopardizes humanity. "The shock of photographed atrocities wears off with 
repeated viewings," she insists, "just as the surprise and bemusement felt the first time 
one sees a pornographic movie wear off after one sees a few more" (20). In this way, On 
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Photography links photographic culture to an erotic, scopophilic relation between the 
viewer and the world, especially the world that serves as other to the image devouring 
middle-class.xv 
Surrealism. Nostalgia, and "The Amorous Relation" 
In 1977, Sontag offered no practical solution to this paradox, insisting that when it comes 
to commemorative strategies, the pursuit of photographic beauty degrades moral 
integrity. "Photographs turn the past into an object of tender regard," she writes, 
"scrambling moral distinctions and disarming historical judgments by the generalized 
pathos of looking at time past" (71). Since all photographs attest to the loss of time, in 
other words, they are powerful producers of nostalgia. Even if intended as scientific and 
documentary objects, photographs inevitably exude an aura of loss and decay, and 
consequently produce a kind of aesthetic pleasure, a "generalized pathos."xvl Eadward 
Muybridge's early frames of a horse galloping, for example, are now more valuable as art 
objects than as scientific data. Sometimes simply the pretense of age evokes a nostalgic 
quality. (The look of agedness—suggested by the use of black-and-white film as well as 
worn edges, a golden patina, imperfections on the film surface—is so valuable, in fact, 
that all image-manipulating programs now include special effects that make new images 
appear old and faded, a process often termed "antiquing.") This points to what Sontag 
calls the "nostalgia for some pristine state of the photographic enterprise" (124). In this 
view, to get one's picture taken at an amusement park, costumed as an outlaw or sheriff, 
does not so much manifest a desire to identify with the Old West as it does a fascination 
with photography's inherent ability to entomb an irretrievable time. 
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Contrast photography's inherent propensity for nostalgia, alongside the ethical 
burden of witnessing the suffering of others, and it is clear why Sontag's solution to the 
problem of photography, decidedly impractical, is to create an "ecology not only of real 
things but of images as well" (180). Only narrative writing, she insists, can redeem the 
sacred force of photography's negative epiphany and "ecologize" (or economize) it so it 
might withstand the bourgeois lust for nostalgic beauty (155-56). 
Sontag does not provide a practical means of controlling the bourgeois desire for 
a photo-beautified reality, but she does reveal who popularized it: surrealism. In 1977, 
she considered the Surrealist sensibility "a bourgeois disaffection" (54) comprised mostly 
of "a few witty fantasies, mostly wet dreams and agoraphobic nightmares" (51), 
embodying all that is self-indulgent and dangerous about modernism. Unlike nineteenth 
century philosophy, which was reproached by Marx for "trying to understand the world 
rather than trying to change it," surrealist photographers "suggest the vanity of even 
trying to understand the world and instead propose that we collect it" (82). Furthermore, 
Sontag effectively demonstrates that all photographs, under the camera's relentlessly 
beautifying eye, are surrealist at heart: 
Illustrating that partly jubilant, partly condescending relation to reality that is 
the rallying point of Surrealism, the photographer's insistence that everything 
is real also implies that the real is not enough. By proclaiming a fundamental 
discontent with reality, Surrealism bespeaks a posture of alienation which has 
now become a general attitude [in the West].... In the past, a discontent with 
reality expressed itself as a longing for another world. In modern society, a 
discontent with reality expresses itself forcefully and most hauntingly by the 
longing to reproduce this one. (80) 
Everywhere she looks, Sontag finds surrealism's haunted longing to fragment reality into 
an array of de-realized, reproducible art objects. Indeed, popular discourse on 
photography suggests the camera has an uncanny power to derive beauty from 
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everything; any bit of cultural detritus can end up in a picture and so is capable of beauty. 
The camera, democratic in the strictest sense, erases the distinction between objects of 
high and low culture. The Paris photos of Eugene Atget, to take one famous example, 
reveal this. The film American Beauty also reveals it quite well. The movie's slogan, 
"Look closer," emphasizes the role of camera technology in revealing America's lost, 
melancholic beauty. It probably did not surprise Sontag that the most visually stunning 
scene in the film, shot through the young protagonist's viewfinder, is of a piece of 
rubbish—an empty bag slowly floating and twisting on an eddy current of air along an 
empty street. "Sometimes there's so much beauty in the world, I feel like I can't take it," 
he says as he stares at the bag whirling ghostlike on the screen. As the tears stream down 
his face, he reminds us that nostalgia is an aesthetic commodity in our culture and that the 
flaneur with a camera has found it haunting every gutter of modern life (55). 
With Sontag's attack on photo aesthetics in mind, we might suspect that Civil 
War photography neither mobilized public resistance to war, nor sustained sensitivity to 
the suffering of others, nor even articulated how war alters American culture and society. 
In truly surrealist fashion, what was produced was a series of images—infinitely 
reproducible in different media contexts and for different political purposes—that 
fascinated, shocked, disgusted, and aroused the viewing public, perhaps simultaneously. 
The first mass circulated war images, like those of today, are spectral: they introduce a 
haunted longing for more photographs of war, a haunting that is repeated when we yearn 
to know (or see) something about, for instance, warfare in the Middle East, crimes 
perpetrated by American soldiers, or mass murders and other human calamities that seem 
to be a common aspect of modern globalized life. For Sontag, to be a photographer is a 
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lustful act. And "like all credible forms of lust," she writes, photography "cannot be 
satisfied: first, because the possibilities of photography are infinite; and, second, because 
the project is finally self-devouring" (179). She suggests that to look upon photographs 
without moral and narrative instruction, especially harrowing photographs, is to risk 
being swept up in an addictive behavior that can blind all of society to human cruelty and 
suffering. 
For the Sontag of 1977, then, only morally confident writing removes 
photography from this cycle of consumerist need and fulfillment. "In contrast to the 
amorous relation, which is based on how something looks," she writes, "understanding is 
based on how it functions. And functioning takes place in time. Only that which narrates 
can make us understand" (23). That is, critical writing is the practical solution to Sontag's 
paradox. The phrase "ecology of images" refers not to images, but to the power of words 
to delimit, conserve, and allot significance to the photographic world. As Sontag, Struk, 
Zelizer, and many others have noted, and as history repeatedly demonstrates, the 
mechanical precision of the camera and the reproducibility of photographs have not 
supplied the world with privileged access to truth. Photography may in fact work against 
the truth that has come to be associated with historical accuracy. (All the writers 
discussed in this chapter, except Beaumont Newhall, offer versions of this point). A 
catastrophe photograph's truth—at its root, a confirmation that images of cruelty, 
devastation, and suffering exist, to be perused in our leisure—can fire the passions and 
vitalize preexisting convictions, but it cannot prove them morally sound or explain the 
political spaces we inhabit. Only written narrative can transmit moral feelings and 
stabilize the ebb and flow of photographic meaning. 
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This argument raises thorny issues for the writing classroom. Though On 
Photography's obsessive attention to the medium suggests a deep respect for and 
fascination with the visual arts, Sontag's conflation of "haunted longing" with perverse 
desire seems to undermine the pedagogical value of photography. It suggests that 
debating the ethics of photojournalism is a moot point, shocking images are not to be a 
commodity of education (unless as a critique of bourgeois aesthetics), and teachers must 
strive to immunize citizens against the compulsions of visual culture (especially 
intellectual laziness). Contrary to her otherwise trenchant cultural insights, Sontag reveals 
a sense of literacy reminiscent of "back to basics" neo-conservatives at their most 
alarmist: 
There is a rancorous suspicion in America of whatever seems literary, not to 
mention a growing reluctance on the part of young people to read anything, 
even subtitles in foreign movies and copy on a record sleeve, which partly 
accounts for the new appetite for books of few words and many photographs. 
(74) 
Sontag defends Art against photography's populist invasion. She sides with Plato's 
indictment of the Image as a sham, as a second-hand form of knowledge, but goes further 
to situate the photograph as the most deceptive image of all, since it is a representation 
that is also a slice of the real and therefore more apt to confuse the boundary between 
reality and replica. Photographic culture has developed an image-fraud so pervasive that 
it erodes the very foundations of human knowledge. The division between reality and 
replica matters less every day, supplanted by "the new appetite." 
But were subtitles, as one of many texts in popular culture, ever immediately 
appealing to youth culture? And how has Sontag gained this intimate knowledge of how 
America's youth reads record sleeves? How and why this sudden outburst against "young 
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people" and their appropriation of images? The more photographic a culture is, she 
insists, the less literate it will be. This is Sontag's only reference to the literacy habits of 
"young people," and she offers no empirical evidence of her claim, so we can't fully 
distill her meaning. But we can pose a good guess: not enough reading and too much 
photography makes for bad writers. 
Why does Sontag—like many others, from Baudelaire to Struk—situate verbal 
narrative as the birthplace of moral understanding, photography as its graveyard? Perhaps 
because at its roots, any photograph is semiotically unstable. Sontag links the 
photograph's lack of stable meaning to a perversion of knowledge: "In contrast to the 
amorous relation, which is based on how something looks, understanding is based on 
how it functions." Here, the pursuit of aesthetic pleasure through photography seems to 
be a bourgeois dalliance, an amorous relation that weakens political understanding, a 
non-response to the overwhelming evidence that we live in a world filled with horror and 
devastation. Understanding from this perspective is a shaking off of the haunted longing 
evoked by the image, an aggressively intellectual rejection of the seamy, voyeuristic 
pleasure evoked by the camera. Surrealist aesthetics and popular visual narratives figure 
the photograph as a ghostly lure, filled with nostalgic, amorous power. Sontag's 
argument asks the viewer to wipe his eyes clean of this web of haunted longing. We must 
look at photos of atrocity with steely-eyed austerity, insisting always on the existence of a 
reality that came before our look, which is to say, before the enactment of our own 
anxieties and desires onto the surface of the image. 
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Disturbing Pleasure 
While Sontag never fully abandoned her moral doubts about photography, she did change 
her stance on the function of "aestheticization." In her final book, Regarding the Pain of 
Others, she still positions narrative as the only valid source of political understanding, but 
now accepts that photography itself serves a crucial role in personal and national forms of 
remembrance: "narratives make us understand: photographs do something else. They 
haunt us" (89). This is a major departure from her earlier text, where the aestheticized fog 
of nostalgia and beauty made photographs morally dubious. In the later text, she insists 
that we must allow ourselves to be haunted by the world's images of suffering. In the 
high-speed circuitry of our globalized image-economy, she notes with melancholy, such 
images will never be in short supply. "There isn't going to be an ecology of images," she 
writes; "no Committee of Guardians is going to ration horror, to keep fresh its ability to 
shock. And the horrors themselves are not going to abate" (108). 
More surprisingly, Sontag acknowledges that some degree of visual pleasure is a 
fundamental aspect of moral existence. She observes that traffic builds up after an 
accident because people want to "see something gruesome" (96), and that "sights of 
degradation and pain and mutilation" have often been experienced as an aspect of the 
sublime (97). Rather than rejecting this as "seamy voyeurism," she situates it as a primary 
aesthetic experience, "a kind of transfiguration ... rooted in religious thinking, which 
links pain to sacrifice, sacrifice to exaltation" (99). In other words, the proliferation of 
distressing photographs can do more than inspire mindless consumption. Meditating on 
them can turn the viewer's experience of looking, into a realization that "human beings 
everywhere do terrible things to one another" (116). 
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In "Picturing Violence: Aesthetics and the Anxiety of Critique," Mark Reinhardt 
extends this argument. He suggests that, though a photograph depicting "extreme 
violence" may not "promote critical vision or deepen understanding," it can transfigure 
that violence into "the subject of a photo that insists one pay sustained attention to its 
formal features": "It is precisely through its aesthetic strategies" that a harrowing image 
"invites both critical engagement and a kind of metacritical reflection on the 
mass-mediated character of disaster" (26). To those who insist we must not transfigure 
horrific events, that we must leave them as they are, Reinhardt responds, "What is the 
alternative to transfiguration? ... It is not as if a photograph of human suffering could 
simply be without aesthetic properties, thus avoiding ... the generation of thought 
and feeling through the interaction between ... form and content (27]." 
In Reinhardt's critique of the anti-pleasure argument—he calls it "the moral 
disapproval of spectacle," a "critical anxiety," "iconoclasm" (27)—it is clear that he and 
the later Sontag are addressing the link between aesthetic experience and critical 
thinking, between form and content, not as a problem but as a potent means of coping 
with human devastation.xv" 
The aim of this chapter is not to promote all out hedonism or to denigrate the hope 
for a more just society. To be sure, the anti-pleasure argument is laudable: it searches for 
forms of remembrance that can acknowledge the horrors of the past without repeating 
them, without trivializing their horror and intensity, and without striving for "surrogate 
victimage." However, it also launches a moral campaign against beauty that I think is 
misplaced in an undergraduate writing course. It is certainly feasible to have students 
analyze the form and content of disturbing images, and to have them reflect in writing on 
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how the act of looking opens ethically charged questions. It is less reasonable to expect 
inexperienced writers to surrender, at the classroom door, the commemorative practices 
and coping mechanisms they bring with them from their home communities. Instead of 
asking students to reject the aesthetic for the sake of the ethical, how might we weave the 
two categories together? How can beauty and pleasure become means toward metacritical 
reflection? Rather than worrying about the pleasure that arises between an image and 
students, how might teachers use the pleasure and beauty of photography to prompt 
writing? 
I have developed a few assignments that I think help me reach these pedagogical 
goals. Before I discuss those, however, I want to think again about the essays mentioned 
at the beginning of this chapter, by Bernard-Donals and George and Shoos. Both articles 
encourage active work with the images of atrocity, as I do. But there is a feature of their 
language that bothers me, and that I suspect shapes how their students are required to 
think and feel about photography. In George and Shoos, it is the term "voyeurism." This 
word turns the human compulsion to see the corrupted body into a distinct, categorical 
perversion—and worse, it makes the casual viewer a perpetrator of the original crime. 
"Do not look at these images on your own," the authors seem to say. And by "on your 
own," of course they mean, "in the way that the mass public views them." The habits of 
communal looking are too pleasurable, the authors imply, and what is needed is a 
substantial dose of de-centered, radically uncomfortable art to clear (obscure) your 
vision. 
Bernard-Donals is also anxious about communal, public modes of looking, and 
the pleasures it produces. For instance, he praises art that fixates on a fractured memory 
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of the Holocaust "in such a way that the blot itself becomes the object of memory" (396), 
encouraging a kind of memory that "makes itself felt as a presence, though a terrifying 
one, that is characterized not so much by loss as by physical trauma" (40In). This desire 
for a "physical trauma" that terrifies suggests a fixation not on the event itself, but on its 
promise of an enduring traumatic disturbance, one that is impervious to cultural systems 
of mourning (such as those practiced in both Christian and Jewish traditions).XV1" 
Dominick LaCapra writes that such a perspective tends to fixate on "trauma as an 
unclaimed experience that occasions the paradoxical witnessing of the breakdown of 
witnessing" (183). It is as if this pedagogy took sadistic pleasure in restricting access to 
those public forms of coping that provide an escape from the pain of a truly ethical 
remembering. 
I make this point not to criticize the sadism inherent in the academic analysis of 
limit-events—I certainly take part in it, as a scholar interested in the history and cultural 
value of photography—but to demonstrate that much critical work attempts to replace 
one kind of pleasure with another that is deemed morally appropriate. Also, the critical 
pleasure involved with studying extreme events is rarely acknowledged, if not fully 
repressed. (Bernard-Donals, for example, does not acknowledge the potential parallel 
between his own desire for a terrifying trauma, and the sadistic pleasure, as Freud tells us, 
that the melancholic derives from directing hostility toward the self.) This results in 
students being criticized for attempting to achieve a kind pleasure when confronting 
disturbing images, as if the academic approach to similar images is somehow free of 
voyeuristic tendencies. An anecdote, told to me by a colleague, suggests that this simply 
isn't true. He had attended a conference presentation dealing with atrocity photographs 
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and the ethics of remembering, during which the presenter vehemently argued that 
academics must champion a kind of looking that will help students ethically confront 
historical atrocity. At the end of her talk, the presenter turned out the lights, fired up her 
overhead projector, and clicked through image after disturbing image, apparently to 
demonstrate why her argument was so worthy of critical interest. This implies an 
academic compulsion to voyeurism that may even exceed that found in more popular, 
non-academic forms of remembering.x,x 
This is simply to say, we are less likely to criticize our own image practices than 
those of our students. Consider, for example, what I feel to be the undue anxiety Bernard-
Donals expresses when he writes, at the conclusion of his poignant rumination over 
Holocaust photographs, that if we do not teach students to resist collective memory, we 
risk recalling the event as if it were a scene from a movie: 
My students told me, with little irony at all, that as they watched the planes 
crash into the World Trade Center they thought it looked just like a movie, 
evidence enough that the effectiveness of a visual representation has come 
dangerously close to supplanting evidence of the event as the benchmark of 
authenticity. (399) 
This reflects a concern over historical forgetting and, by extension, a fear that aspects of 
historical atrocity will be allowed to repeat. It also reflects anxiety over the phantasmic 
fabrication of reality as a populist form of visual consumerism. Because of its association 
with collective visuality, it seems, the cinematic analogy is dangerous. The pleasure it 
produces is distinctly public, with an expectation that it will be understood by others in 
the movie theater. Movies, because of our familiarity with their conventions, turn even 
the most "terrifying ... physical trauma" into something that can be tolerated. 
I submit that teachers need to be more tolerant of such homely tricks of the mind. 
It is our way of coping with unimaginable, unspeakable, unbearable events. I believe it 
was Wallace Stevens who wrote, "In the presence of extraordinary reality, consciousness 
takes the place of imagination"—a provocative comment on what is lost in the realm of 
trauma: the luxury of one's imagination. Our students often, though not always, lack our 
rhetorical sophistication and more considerable life experiences, and therefore tend to 
lack the means we have at our disposal, as academics, for gaining pleasure from ethical 
and political researches into extreme history."" 
We have numerous reasons to suspect that the compulsion to look at the human 
form, both whole and fragmented, is hardwired into our species. A pedagogy that uses 
photographs must deal with this compulsion head on, since the body is manifest in 
photography as it is in no other visual mode (except for theater and dance, neither of 
which we can hold in our pocket like a photograph). The three sample assignments listed 
below are my attempt at helping students deal with this compulsion to look and to find 
formal meaning in the world, even the world destroyed. In line with Bernard-Donals and 
George and Shoos, I want to use photography as a way to think about history. But like 
Sontag and Reinhardt, I also designed the activities as a way to help students enjoy 
photographs aesthetically, as beautiful things that follow events that, in themselves, are 
anything but beautiful. 
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Sample Assignment #4 
Photographic Remembering and Catastrophic Events 
[ 
[Originally assigned September 11, 2006] 
What images remind us of the September 11th attacks? What stories have we told ourselves, and 
to what end? Do the photos from 2001 still resonate with us? 
Who is the "us"? Do the narratives and photographs of 9/11 construct a sense of us-ness? Are 
there images that don't? Are there images that make you feel differently—alienated, separate, inward, 
meditative? Where are those images? Who took them? Under what circumstances? 
Do any of these images challenge you? "Challenge" can mean more than sad. It can also mean 
disturb, perplex, provoke, stimulate. It can mean that an image makes you doubt or question rather than 
making you reassured and comfortable. 
Are any of these images beautiful? Can such an image be beautiful? Can the horrific be 
beautified? (What, then, is beauty?) 
What do such images have to do with you? Or, what do you have to do with them? How might 
you impact the visual world? In this image-economy filled with photographs of death and calamity, what is 
your role? Will the images you weave into this essay, for example, alter, support, or challenge the public 
use of images? 
How do photographs shape how we remember an event? 
Find images from magazines and newspapers or even personal albums that remind you of the 
attacks of September 11 th, or simply of that year in your life. Begin writing with these images in front of 
you. Your content does not have to focus on the attacks or even anything explicitly political, but your 
overall narrative will be an attempt to commemorate this moment in your history as well as the nation's. 
Figure 4. Sample Assignment #4 
A number of the texts students produced for this assignment illustrate what I have 
tried to argue in this chapter. One student lamented the seeming lack of moral outrage in 
the American public regarding war and global suffering, expressing an ambivalent 
relationship with some of America's most enduring images of calamity. "We need 
pictures," she writes, "or else it seems like we feel nothing," and yet "movies and 
television have numbed us to a point about what's going on in the world." 
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When September 11 happened, no one really knew how to react, but what I 
heard the most from people was that the whole thing was like a movie. It's 
unfortunate that we can just easily link a horrible terrorist attack to the 
movies we create. They're not the same thing. 
As Bernard-Donals noted about his classrooms, students did indeed speak of 
"experiencing" the attacks as if they had been scenes in a movie. This writer reveals the 
indignation of a viewer who has realized that this common, culturally accepted response 
to atrocity is too shallow. The "movies we create" are a sign that imagination has taken 
the place of reality, and that consequently humanity is suffering a crisis of empathy. 
What I really find valuable in this essay, though, isn't its adherence to a politically 
correct anger at her peers, but its ambivalence. We need photographs or we risk feeling 
nothing, she writes, and yet when we do feel something, it is contrived and we lose sight 
of the actual event. She despises the photographs for what they have done to her society, 
and yet she is searching for something in them, something authentic, uncontrived. She is 
searching for an aesthetic engagement with her photographs, while sustaining a critique 
of how they have distanced viewers from reality. 
For this student, the ambiguity was deep, and generative. Discussing the Vietnam 
era image of a monk in the process of self-immolation, she cannot clearly distinguish 
between the historic reality depicted by the image, and her own imaginative investment in 
the scene of suffering: 
I guess it's a good thing that people react to pictures the way they do. My 
first instinct, however, is to get mad at us as a people. We wait for a picture 
until we react. And I feel like a lot of times, we are reacting to the picture and 
not necessarily what is actually going on. When I look at the [Vietnam era] 
picture of the burning monk, and all the pictures I printed, my reaction is 
'that's awful.' But the truth is that it's more than awful. Someone set 
[himself] on fire in protest of a war. That is crazy to even think about. I don't 
approve of the war going on, but there is no way I would kill myself, or 
anyone else, in protest. 
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The ambiguity of this paragraph is in its space between the "I" and the "us," between the 
community responding with passivity, and the I responding with rage. The paragraph 
epitomizes for me the true resourcefulness of students, the authenticity of their ways of 
looking and feeling: this writer has learned that "we" should not respond to horrific 
events with passivity and that if disturbing photographs are going to be used for moral 
purposes, than all of us need to be enraged. Yet, the last three sentences twist away from 
the concern for a communal experience, and assert the writer's sense of self-preservation. 
Confronted with an image whose reality tears at the imagination, this writer decides to let 
the monk burn on his own. She refuses the muted or secondary trauma that this image 
makes available ("crazy to even think about") and instead allows her affective response 
to the image stand in contrast to her more explicitly political comments. In this way, she 
accomplishes the impossible: she looks closely at photographs as both a member of a 
community and as an individual. 
I think this is as much as I can ask from such an assignment. The writer grappled 
with the difficult boundary between communal engagement (the "us as a people") and 
personal expression ("There is no way I would kill myself). And if this piece were to go 
into revision, I would not want this fierce expression of self to be abdicated for the sake 
of a historical analysis of the Vietnam War. I would certainly accept such an analysis, but 
it is this writer's stylistic engagement with the images that allows the photographs as 
such to remain a part of the essay's overall form. 
The next sample assignment works well in conjunction with the readings in 
Ballenger and Payne's The Curious Reader, mentioned at the start of this chapter.**1 The 
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end goal is an essay, done in the style of a newspaper editorial or column, that 
incorporates one or more disconcerting photographs. 
Sample Assignment #5 
The Impossible Task of the Photo Editor 
[This activity follows from a series of readings that deal with the troubled ethics of 
photojournalism. Students have been talking about images of atrocity and other shocking pictures for two 
weeks leading up to this day. Still, as a rule, I emphasize to them in advance that there will be 20 unsettling 
images taped around the room. I give each of them the option of skipping the activity; nobody has done so, 
yet.] 
With your class notebook and a pen in hand, walk around the room and look closely at each 
photograph. For each, write down the number of the image and either "yes" or "no," depending on whether 
or not you would allow the image to be shown in your local newspaper. 
In small groups, choose three images to be shown on the front page. Why have you chosen 
these above the others? Are there visual features that make them stand out above the others? Formally, 
what is most striking about the image—the lighting, Composition, use of color, visual symmetry? Does it 
remind you of any other scenes, photographic, painted, or cinematic? 
At your own desk, write a brief paragraph about each image. What words do you imagine will 
accompany each image? Why do you think these words have presented themselves to you? What is it about 
the image that makes it worth being written about? 
Finally, spend 10 minutes reflecting on the strangeness of this exercise. What did it feel like 
looking at these photographs and thinking, for example: "How does the lighting direct the viewer's eye?" 
or "I like the symmetry in this scene." This is certainly not how we've learned to approach images like 
this—if, in fact, we've ever learned. Which leads to the most important question: What are you learning 
about looking? What does close, intimate work with distressing images teach us about the suffering of 
others? 
Figure 5. Sample Assignment #5 
In the very next class, we follow up with a cropping assignment. 
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Sample Assignment #6 
The Art of the Crop 
[Before this day, students will have worked closely with a number of images. To begin the 
activity, I hand each student four 12x2 inch strips of black construction paper. Again, students are able to 
opt out of this activity if it proves too distressing; however, in my experience, students are always 
interested in the work.] 
On your desk in front of you, spread out the three photographs you have been working with. Use 
the strips as the four sides of a box, for which each side can slide in or out, and place the open "window" of 
this box directly over one of the images. By sliding the lateral and top/bottom strips, crop distinct areas of 
the image. Do so with each image, marking with your pencil the location of the best crop. 
How does cropping the image change its rhetorical potential? Where are the viewer's eyes drawn, 
when you cut out bits of the scene? When focusing in on a face, hands, a bit of the dirt, how have you 
limited the viewer's experience of this image? How can we do this kind of work in our writing? 
Figure 6. Sample Assignment #6 
These three assignments are all challenging because they ask students to pore over 
disturbing photographs formally, as aesthetic objects, but also conceptually, as potential 
sources of argument and narrative. Between form and content, we arrive at a more 
complex sense of how these images work on us. If consciousness takes the place of 
imagination in times of great duress, as Wallace Stevens once wrote, then these activities 
are a means of reasserting the imagination. By using their creative eye—looking for 
visual patterns, looking for a formal coherence—and working on these images that 
cripple the imagination, students are given some small, fragile, probably temporary bit of 
agency. This work is never pleasurable in the sense of fun or light hearted—but, 
impossibly, with care and imagination, these unthinkable, unspeakable scenes become 
transfigured in the work students do. And, for better or worse, it is a transformation that 
can only take place through the photographic image. 
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EPILOGUE 
This dissertation proposes a sequence of writing assignments that attempt to 
merge a sensitivity to aesthetics with an awareness of ethics and politics. Moving 
between the first and last chapters, I show how students are encouraged to engage 
increasingly more complex issues of visual pleasure and social obligation. What has 
been emphasized in each case is the inseparability of aesthetics and politics—a disturbing 
proposition when, as in Chapter IV, the stakes of photographic looking are so high. I have 
not proposed historical or political insensitivity, but have contended that the photograph 
does not allow viewers to ultimately settle the question over whether or not it is an art 
object, or a political object—it is both, I have suggested, and in this ever split identity, in 
this radical ambiguity, the photograph becomes an ideal tool for teaching. 
The classroom practices introduced in Chapter I are meant to teach aesthetic 
strategies commonly used by professional photographers, both artists and journalists. 
Since these practices are historically and culturally specific, engaging in them allows us 
to investigate our society's artistic habits, as well as to interrogate why, personally, we 
find certain images beautiful, disgusting, boring, etc. The first museum exhibit of 
William Eggleston (published in book form as William Eggleston's Guide 2002), which 
serves as the basis for our work with photography in that chapter, demonstrates how 
aesthetic predispositions serve political ends—most early critics of Eggleston hated his 
images, and vehemently resisted the presentation of his photographs. Also, however, 
those critics' emotional responses to Eggleston show us that politics and aesthetics exist 
on a two-way street—one's political stance shapes one's affective response to certain 
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photographs, and one's sense of the beautiful or the ugly inform the tenor of one's 
political sensibilities. We cannot sift out affect from political thinking, as social semiotics 
seems to imply. 
The rest of the chapters follow something like a traditional curricular trajectory, 
moving from personal writing to the research essay to more complex forms of critical 
thinking. However, critical thinking is never disconnected from an interest in style, 
aesthetics, and the affective power of photography. When we reach the cropping activity 
at the end of Chapter IV, it becomes impossible, unimaginable, to detach our sense of that 
visual work with the critical task of thinking about a damaged history. In the writing 
such photo activities produce, what makes writing good is both political and artful. 
That is to say, the claims about photography I've made here are part of the 
ongoing concerns in Composition regarding the tensions between style and politics, the 
personal and the communal, aesthetics and ethics—all key issues that have been with the 
field since its beginnings, as I discuss in the introduction. I feel that photography offers a 
compelling way to bring this tension to the surface, without privileging one term over the 
other. More to the point, the photographic theories and practices discussed here present a 
model of the writing classroom that always pushes for the middle space, between an 
interest in pleasure and the beautiful, and an interest in social justice and the horrific. I 
realize this is not a simple, easy, or always possible goal. Sometimes, aesthetic concerns 
tend to drown out political concerns, and vice versa. 
This is why I have reached beyond conventional Composition theory to construct 
my approach to writing instruction. By and large, I think it can sometimes be too easy 
for members of a discipline to recycle familiar theoretical claims and presuppositions, 
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rather than reaching further for fresh perspectives. This insight comes to me from 
personal experience. In the first year of my Ph.D. program, I attended a conference on 
Composition and Rhetoric, from which I remember only two speakers: Peter Elbow and 
David Bleich. These are widely regarded scholars in our field, both somewhat iconic 
figures for a particular approach to the classroom. I can't recall the content of their 
presentations, but I do remember that after each presentation, as people were milling 
about and chatting, somebody said about Peter Elbow's talk, "I have no idea what he was 
talking about." Later, just after David Bleich's presentation, I heard a different teacher 
use the exact same phrase about Bleich: "I have no idea what he was talking about." 
This dissertation has been attempt to have an idea about, to genuinely understand, 
what each of the dominant approaches to writing instruction have to say. They do not 
often speak to each other and sometimes when they do, it is to criticize, denounce, and 
discard. My goal here has been to produce scholarship that takes the claims, values, and 
biases of each of them seriously. Again, I believe a photographic pedagogy gives us a 
vigorous way to do so: both expressive and social models of writing instruction want to 
produce better writers and, I venture to guess, better citizens. Photography, as I have 
described it in this dissertation, pulls writers deeply into both artistic and ethical 
reflection. What's more, it does this by never settling, finally, on one side or the other, as 
art or as political object. Rather, the photograph's inherent ambiguity of meaning, when 
actually searched out by artists and cultural critics alike, produces a rich, thick space of 
creativity and critical analysis. This space, which includes all the words, images, 
feelings, and theories available to us, is the space of rhetoric. 
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